



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE 1974 CRISIS OVER CYPRUS:
FOREIGN WILL OR ETHNIC CONFLICT?**

by

Ioannis Vlachos

June 2007

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Donald Abenheim
Jeffrey Knopf

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE June 2007	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The 1974 Crisis Over Cyprus: Foreign Will or Ethnic Conflict?		5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Ioannis Vlachos		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.		
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>This thesis presents a study of the crisis over Cyprus that lasted many years and concluded with the bloody events of the summer of 1974. The intervention of the military dictatorship from Greece and the subsequent Turkish invasion may have been the culmination of this crisis, but this thesis will show, contrarily to common perceptions, the causes of the crisis were not primarily a function of ethnic hatred.</p> <p>This thesis concludes that the reasons for the conflict are found mainly in the actions of the international powers and the consequences of the Cold war. Based on these findings the thesis explains the unsuccessful efforts of the United Nation to find a compromise and a solution that is accepted by the people of Cyprus.</p> <p>Lastly, the thesis outlines a plan that could be approved by all Cypriots and could offer unity and stability in Cyprus, based on the mandates and the protection of international organizations.</p>		
14. SUBJECT TERMS Ethnic Conflict, Cyprus, Greek Dictatorship, Turkish Invasion		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 125
		16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified
		20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THE 1974 CRISIS OVER CYPRUS: FOREIGN WILL OR ETHNIC CONFLICT?

Ioannis Vlachos
Lieutenant Junior Grade, Hellenic Navy
B.S., Hellenic Naval Academy, 2000

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2007

Author: Ioannis Vlachos

Approved by: Dr. Donald Abenheim
Thesis Co-Advisor

Dr. Jeffrey Knopf
Thesis Co-Advisor

Dr. Douglas Porch
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

This thesis presents a study of the crisis over Cyprus that lasted many years and concluded with the bloody events of the summer of 1974. The intervention of the military dictatorship from Greece and the subsequent Turkish invasion may have been the culmination of this crisis, but this thesis will show, contrarily to common perceptions, the causes of the crisis were not primarily a function of ethnic hatred.

This thesis concludes that the reasons for the conflict are found mainly in the actions of the international powers and the consequences of the Cold war. Based on these findings the thesis explains the unsuccessful efforts of the United Nation to find a compromise and a solution that is accepted by the people of Cyprus.

Lastly, the thesis outlines a plan that could be approved by all Cypriots and could offer unity and stability in Cyprus, based on the mandates and the protection of international organizations.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	HISTORICAL REVIEW	5
A.	THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE CRISIS UNTIL THE INVASION.....	5
B.	ATTILA I: THE FIRST INVASION	14
C.	ATTILA II: THE SECOND INVASION.....	16
III.	THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND THE ETHNONATIONAL REALITY	19
A.	ETHNONATIONALISM AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON	22
B.	ETHNONATIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS IN CYPRUS	24
C.	WHY THE CONFLICT IN CYPRUS WAS NOT LIKE OTHER ETHNIC CONFLICTS	26
IV.	HOW INTERNATIONAL POWERS, THE TWO MOTHERLANDS, DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, CIVIL WARS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS INFLUENCED THE CRISIS.....	33
A.	THE INTERNATIONAL POWERS: GREAT BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE SOVIET UNION	33
1.	Great Britain	33
2.	The United States	39
3.	The Soviet Union.....	47
B.	THE TWO CYPRIOT MOTHERLANDS: GREECE AND TURKEY ..	49
1.	Greece.....	49
2.	Turkey	56
3.	The Turkish State	56
C.	DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AND CIVIL WARS	61
1.	Cyprus	61
a.	<i>Communal Influences</i>	62
b.	<i>Individual Influences</i>	66
D.	INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: NATO AND THE UN	70
1.	NATO	70
2.	The UN	72
V.	ASSESSING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES.....	75
A.	THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT	75
B.	CONSEQUENCES OF THE MILITARY VIOLENCE	78
C.	CRITIQUE OF THE UN PLAN.....	81
D.	CYPRUS TODAY	87
VI.	CONCLUSION-FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR A SOLUTION IN CYPRUS	91
APPENDIX.....		97
LIST OF REFERENCES.....		105
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST		109

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Map of Cyprus	1
Figure 2.	Map of Cyprus during the first and second Turkish invasion.....	16
Figure 3.	The British Prime Minister in 1974: Harold Wilson.	34
Figure 4.	The American Secretary of the State in 1974: Henry Kissinger.....	39
Figure 5.	The General Secretary of the Soviet Party in 1974: Leonid Brezhnev.....	47
Figure 6.	The “Colonels”: Leaders of the Dictatorship in Greece from '67-'74.....	50
Figure 7.	The first Greek Prime Minister after the dictatorship: Konst. Karamanlis.....	51
Figure 8.	The Turkish Prime Minister in 1974: Bulent Ecevit.....	57
Figure 9.	The Cypriot “Ethnarch” and President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios.....	66
Figure 10.	The leader of the Turkish-Cypriots Rauf Denktash in 1974.....	69
Figure 11.	Map of Cyprus Today.....	87
Figure 12.	Cyprus after the UN Plan’s Entry into Force.....	88
Figure 13.	Copy of Makarios' message to the American President Ford.....	97
Figure 14.	Copy of the American denial to the Turkish ambitions.....	100
Figure 15.	Copy of the American embassy's message to the U.S. Secretary,.....	102
Figure 16.	Copy of the American National Security Council to the U.S. Secretary.....	104

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	The Prisoners' Dilema Table of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.....	65
----------	--	----

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank all the non-Cypriots who studied and described the drama of the people of Cyprus, made it known all over the world and fought in favor of a righteous resolution for the future of both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, and the armor of the island's democracy. I also thank the people of Cyprus for enduring with their faith against their drama and still hoping for a better tomorrow.

I thank the Hellenic Navy, the Naval Postgraduate School and my advisors Donald Abenheim and Jeffrey Knopf for giving me the opportunity to learn about these tragic events of recent history and understand the principles of democracy, equality and "right to life" against the prejudice and the hatred of nationalism. This thesis is an honest and dispassionate study of the events that separated a peaceful for many centuries island and enslaved morally its people in separate lives. The last chapter's suggested resolution is more of a hope and appeal to the United Nations and the international community for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots' prayers.

I mostly thank my wife Nancy for being always besides me, even during her absence, and bringing our daughter into life during this thesis.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION



Figure 1. Map of Cyprus¹

In the summer of 1974, extremist paramilitary Greek-Cypriots who favored unification of Cyprus with Greece after the declared independence of Cyprus in 1960, supported by the Greek dictatorship in Greece, abolished the democratic principles of the island and aroused anti-Turkish feelings through a military coup. In response Turkey, alleging as its reason Turkish-Cypriots' security, invaded and captured the northern part of the island. The Turkish invasion may have given an end to the rising internal conflict, but not an end to the problems that created and caused this conflict as well.

The 1974 conflict in Cyprus was only the apogee of a multisided problem with a long history predictive of the sequence of dramatic incidents that will be discussed in this thesis. The following chapters will show how a chain of international and domestic events and political and social factors led to a crisis in Cyprus. The crisis went from simply internal agitation to disruption of the constitutional government to a Turkish invasion that caused many thousands of deaths and changed forever the distribution of

¹ Kypros-net Inc., "The World of Cyprus," http://kypros.org/Occupied_Cyprus/images/maps/cyprus_1974_657_bg.jpg. (May 2007).

the island's populations. All those factors combined or even any one of them could be the basis of a case study that would interpret, justify, or criticize their contribution to the 1974 crisis. No effort to explain the conflict or to provide a viable and credible future solution, however, should claim that the crisis had only one main cause.

There are many studies, articles, and books that contain serious and persuasive attempts to provide an appropriate solution to what is often described as "the Cyprus problem." And many state leaders, armies, and diplomatic services, whether they participated in the historic events surrounding the crisis or not, have found it necessary in detailed studies to apologize for or justify their involvement, direct or indirect. While all of them are involved in shaping the future for Cyprus, however, prospects for a better future came to rest in the hands of the United Nations, which took control after the Turkish invasion and tried to create a formula for reuniting the divided state. But despite many years and a long process of study, work, and negotiations they did not reach a successful conclusion, leaving many leaders, scholars, and people in general with questions and doubts that any solution will ever be found. The culmination of this failure was the Greek Cypriot community's rejection of UN Secretary General Kofi Anan's fifth plan in April 2004.

This thesis tries to identify the reasons for the ultimate UN failure. It challenges the dominant argument in the literature, which considers ethnic rivalry as the major cause of the conflict. Thus, far, the UN's efforts have been guided by a conventional "ethnic conflict" rhetoric that claimed there was Greco-Turkish rivalry between both the various communities and the state leaders and that was used to justify foreign involvement. Thus, the UN efforts retained separatism on the island and accepted the status quo created by the Turkish invasion. No attempt was made to change that.

In Chapters III and IV, the thesis attempts to demonstrate that the conflict was *not* produced by ethnic rivalry, but rather by foreign political factors. Against that background, therefore, Chapter V comprises a harsh critique of the UN practices in regard to the so-called Cyprus problem. Thus, essentially, this thesis challenges, first, the bodies of power and decision-making that consider the Cyprus crisis an extension of an historic Greco-Turkish rivalry and focus only on the ethnic dimension, as did the creators

of the disastrous 1960 Constitution. Second, the thesis challenges those who exploit the ethnic dimension in the region as a means to gain political, economic, and strategic benefits. And, third, the thesis challenges those who claim or pretend to establish an independent democratic state while at the same time keeping it subject to foreign interests.

Over the centuries, the peculiar symbiosis of two such different communities as the Greek and Turkish Cypriots – different in their origins, traditions, history, and language – was a natural breeding ground for mutual mistrust and prejudice. That was greatly exacerbated by the London-Zurich agreement and call for independence in 1960. There is no doubt that the Cyprus issue has an “ethnic” element that creates “ethnic” rivalry and “ethnic” losses. However, despite the mix of unfriendly ethnicities in the conflict, we will show that it is primarily external factions that used ethnicity as a means to achieve their goals that were responsible for the evolution of events. Whatever the causes of this tragic situation, the victims are unquestionably the Cypriot people. They suffered first from the indifference of the international community toward settling the uprising, and afterward from its unsuccessful and mercenary intervention. In regard to the Cyprus question, the international community proved incapable both of following its own norms and of resolving complicated ethno-political problems.

The thesis makes an important contribution to the long-standing debate about the Cyprus problem. It examines, in respect to both the pre-invasion and the post-invasion period, the main question: whether any UN resolution to the problem would be viable. In the conclusion, the thesis presents a possible general model of a united state that would be acceptable to both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. The model is founded on the concept of a free, independent state that would be based on a free, independent economy. However, any resolution to the Cyprus issue will prove inadequate, if not impossible, if it is not preserved and enforced by strong, decisive organizations such as the UN, NATO, the OSCE, etc.

The analysis that follows examines the ethno-national reality in Cyprus and the international and domestic political, economic, strategic, and social factors that have contributed to the conflict. To provide an objective context, we begin with a brief overview of Cyprus's history, from its origination to 1974, the climatic year of its occupation.

II. HISTORICAL REVIEW

A. THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE CRISIS UNTIL THE INVASION

This chapter reviews the main historical events of Cyprus's history, which influenced the demography and determined the cultural distinctiveness of the island. This history, will trace the sensitivities that could allow the divergences of the island to flare into conflict and so justify the dramatic days of summer of 1974.

After Sardinia and Sicily, Cyprus is the largest island in the Mediterranean Sea. It is located 40 miles south of Turkey, 500 miles southeast of Greece, and 70 miles west of the Middle East. Because it lies in the crossroads of three continents, Europe, Asia, and Africa, and is wealthy in natural beauty and resources, throughout history, Cyprus has been the target of would-be conquerors.

The Greeks settled Cyprus 5,000 years ago and comprise the majority of its population. Over the years, Hittites, Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Romans, Byzantines, Ottomans, and British have ruled Cyprus, known as the Island of Venus,² always taking from her civilizations and her cultural and material treasures. In 1571, the Ottoman Empire added Cyprus to its conquests, marking the beginning of a doleful chapter of her history. Three centuries later, in 1878, just before the British took control, the Turkish community was 18 percent of the total population of 600,000, while 80 percent was Greek, and 2 percent Armenian, Latin, and Hebrew. The British agreed to maintain the Ottoman dominance over the island and to continue their subordination tax to the sublime Porte. However, in 1914, because the Ottomans had cooperated with the Germans during the First World War, the British annexed Cyprus and, in 1925, the Treaty of Lausanne made it an official British colony. What is strange is that the Greeks subsequently denied having offered Cyprus to the British during the war in an effort to gain their support in a war in which the Greeks eventually participated.

² According to Greek mythology, Venus (or *Aphrodite*, which means “to break surface in the foam of the sea”) was born in the foam of the shallow waters of Cyprus and was the most beautiful Goddess of the Olympic Gods, just as Cyprus is one of the most beautiful islands of the Mediterranean Sea.

Since then, relations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities have been in crisis because of the Greek Cypriots' demands for self-determination through unification of the island with their motherland, Greece. Notably, however, the agitations of 1931 did not involve the indifferent Turkish Cypriot community. They were directed by the Greek Cypriots at the British administration and succeeded in abolishing its legislative council and its associated decrees. In 1941, the British secretary of state offered to return Cyprus to the Greeks by the end of World War II – although keeping British bases there – in recognition of the Greeks' contribution in fighting the Axis.³ But the Ministry of Colonies reacted negatively to this idea, fearing a domino effect involving other British colonies. Nonetheless, the great idea of *enosis*, unification with Greece, was implanted deep in the minds of the Greek Cypriots and would not be easily uprooted. In any case, the Greek government⁴ was not eager to fight for that unification, which would mean contradicting the Great Powers' policies in Greece.

In 1950, Bishop Makarios, who embodied the Greek Cypriots' hope for *enosis*, was elected Archbishop of Cyprus. At the same time, the United States took control, giving new hope to the Greek side, which was now homogeneous. In 1951, Greece and Turkey became members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

In 1954, a new rapprochement to the British from Greece's Prime Minister Papagos that requested Cyprus's annexation was denied by the Ministry of Colonies due to Cyprus's great strategic and military importance to Great Britain. The first Greeks to react to the denial were Archbishop Makarios and a hard-line colonel named Grivas. During the Greek resistance against the Germans, Grivas had inspired the creation of a national organization of Cypriot fighters, a resistance team known as the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*), or EOKA,

³ According to Richard Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 171, Anthony Eden (the British secretary of state) "was afraid the Germans might score a propaganda triumph by capturing the island and formally ceding it to Greece." It seems strange that the Germans would give the island to Greece, which had defended the members of the Axis from 1940 (the Italians) and 1941 (the Germans).

⁴ In regard to the annexed territories, the primary national target for early post-WWII Greece was the acquisition of north Epirus, in southern Albania, which was dominated by the dominant Greek ethnics and had been freed after the Greco-Italian war.

dedicated to freeing Cyprus from the British and uniting it with Greece. Who could have predicted that this struggle would last twenty years and would comprise the bloodiest pages of Cypriot history?

In respect to Great Britain's interests on the island, things became more complicated after Britain's loss of Suez in 1954 and the end of the French conflict with Egypt. Realizing that it would be very difficult to protect their interests against the Greek Cypriots' struggle for *enosis*⁵ and the increasing opposition to the British presence, they exploited the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot factions, which were indifferent, if not without interests and rights at the time. Turkey's interests were represented in the partitioning of Cyprus, a separation of the two communities into separate territories that would either be unified eventually with their motherlands, or, through a natural evolution process, become two independent, self-administrative states.

Turkey's national disillusionment in this regard soon became transformed to a nationalistic passion that in 1955 resulted in violent actions against its wealthy and powerful Greek minority, a total of 100,000 people in Istanbul. They had been granted permission to live there by the 1929 Treaty of Lausanne. The withdrawal of Greek officers from the NATO headquarters at Izmir which followed the violence reaffirmed the breakdown in bilateral relations. After an ambiguous American intervention, King Paul of Greece appointed Kostantinos Karamanlis⁶ prime minister, a change he hoped would benefit Cyprus against the Menderez government in Turkey.

But in light of the disillusionment of both Great Britain and Turkey, the Greek position had shifted to one of absolute and rigid Greek objectives. And neither Great Britain nor Turkey was disposed to be receptive to the Greek and Greek Cypriot majority's demands for self-determination, for that would deprive them of key geopolitical and strategic benefits. Thus, the British stance hardened. And when Makarios

⁵ The resistance forces falsely claimed and the Greek-Cypriot community believed that the much desired enosis posited persecution of the British bases from the island. Unification with Greece would only be admissible and effective if the bases were maintained, since Britain was a NATO ally and, moreover, there were American bases scattered around Greece.

⁶ Prime Minister Karamanlis, who was known for his American sympathies, supported his country's dependence on and connection to the Western world. Throughout his career he served those ideas.

was banished from the island in 1956, the violent reactions organized by EOKA resulted in casualties on both sides. In that same year, a draft constitution calling for an independent and autonomous Cyprus was rejected by the Greek government, which hoped to gain the desired unification from the United Nations. It believed that any “partnership” in the administration of Cyprus was conducive to the partition of the island. However, after Makarios’ return in 1958, this “partnership” became negotiable for the Greeks because of the bishop’s attitude of goodwill and spirit of conciliation toward the idea of independence.

In February 1959, the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey, Karamanlis and Menderez, met in Zurich to discuss Cyprus independence and eventually signed the Zurich-London agreement. Though the agreement provided independence for Cyprus, it did not take into sufficient consideration the real situation and the dysfunctional constitution, which made Britain, Greece, and Turkey⁷ responsible for the constitution’s security and operability. Under the terms of the agreement, Greece would maintain a guard of 950 men in Cyprus, and Turkey 650 men. Both the Greek Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios, and the Turkish Cypriot vice president, Dr. Kiutsuk, would have a veto right. But the complicated distribution of power among the subordinate bodies of the administration⁸ promised a conflicted and insecure future for the island. Despite the popular archbishop’s election as president in December 1959, the general response of the

⁷ The treaty gave permission for each of the members equally to intervene in the island, exerting its legal right in order to protect its people. The question evoked by this is, How indiscriminately can this right be, since Cyprus does not consist of the two nations responsible for securing its protection and integrity.

⁸ The Turkish representation of the public sector positions covered almost one third of the total, instead of the 18 percent of its population evoking reactions from the Greek side. The veto capability of the two presidency positions made difficult, if not impossible, the decision-making on bilateral issues depriving the region of co-evolution and homogenization of the communities which proved to be the most important for peaceful living. Moreover, the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Defense – the most important Ministries – were given to Turks, while the decision-making of the Council of Ministers was adjusted to an absolute majority. The House of Representatives, which exercised the legislative power, consisted of 35 Greeks and 15 Turkish-Cypriots. Judiciary power and the armed and security forces represented an unequal percentage of the population, which gave increased power to the Turkish-Cypriots, but would have eliminated their presence on the island if it were smaller. Dinko Dinkov and Stoyan Stoyanov, “The Cyprus Problem: International Politics Simulation,” *Managerial Law* 47:3-4 (2005): 171. ProQuest CSA, <http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?index=1&did=922973211&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fm=t=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1144134795&clientId=11969&cfc=1>. (March 2007).

Greek Cypriots to the new situation was dispirited. Subsequent events proved even more problematic, as EOKA declared it would continue the struggle to “defend history’s rights,” causing a rupture between their leader, Colonel Grivas, and Makarios.

In late 1963, President Makarios presented Vice President Kiutsuk with thirteen amendments to the so-called “unworkable” constitution, including some articles characterized as “unalterable.” When the Turkish side refused to accept the amendments,⁹ the Turkish cabinet ministers were forced to resign, as well as those in high administrative positions in the public services and all the civil servants. According to the Greek side, this move had been directed by Turkey and was aimed at creating unbearable tension among members of the current government over the proposed creation of a separate, autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration. The Turks had a different interpretation of those events. According to them, Makarios dismissed all the ministers and discharged the Turkish Cypriot representatives at the UN in order to sever the channels of communication and representation to the Turkish Cypriot community.¹⁰ And these were only the beginning skirmishes. On 21 December 1963, Turkish planes flew over Cyprus, and, in January 1964, the American president, Lyndon Johnson, sent General Lemnitger (SACEUR) to advise the Greeks and the Turks in reaching a compromise, and thus, avoid any invasion.

The next crisis occurred in the summer of 1964 when, after President Johnson’s intervention and severe admonition of Turkey’s President Inonu rejecting any possibility of an invasion, Turkish decisiveness was greatly diminished. Nonetheless, in August, serious conflicts, mainly in the suburban villages, severely undermined, perhaps forever, the possibility of peace and security in the island. The Turkish civilians congregated into small zones and the Turkish air force took action in revenge. Though Makarios was willing to compromise in respect to Cyprus’s independence and to solve its problems in a bilateral fashion, the Greek government tried to stifle his ambitions and take control of the situation. It sent Grivas back to Cyprus. But the opportunity for the Greek interests to

⁹ Archbishop Makarios ignored the High Court’s verdict reaching the anti-constitutionality of the amendments.

¹⁰ Dinkov and Stoyanov, “The Cyprus Problem,” 171.

annex Cyprus was lost when Greece's President, George Papandreu, rejected the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson's plan, which provided for the unification of Cyprus with Greece and the continued maintaining of Turkish bases and the creation of Turkish cantons on the island.¹¹

During the next three years, Turkey weighed America's decisiveness in deterring an invasion, while preparing militarily and exacerbating relations between the two communities and against Turkish civilians so as to have an excuse for intervention. At the time, Makarios was trying to keep control of the Greek Cypriot community, against Grivas's concerted attempts to conscript them and to terrorize the Turkish Cypriots and eventually unify Cyprus with Greece. The only thing Grivas managed to do, however, was to separate the Greek Cypriot community into two camps and awaken the nationalist fervor of the Turkish Cypriots. From the beginning of the crisis, they were vulnerable and alone, divided even from their motherland's political and military objectives.

Throughout this period, Greece was entangled in an effort to define its democratic identity through the alternating of often contrary but similarly unstable parties, which were unsuccessful in fulfilling their promise in the country's governance. The three-year instability concluded with a coup on 21 April 1967. A group of Greek colonels, who were well prepared and well informed, surprised everyone by using the army to capture the most important posts of the administration and take control of the country.¹² What was most remarkable, they succeeded by following a NATO plan for dealing with such internal situations. They established a dictatorship, imposed military rule, abolished the

¹¹ Clogg, *Short History of Modern Greece*, 180–182. The plan included annexation of the Greek island Castelorizo by the Turks. Today, this incidence is considered a great loss, but then it seemed impossible. According to Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *The American Conspiracy: America, Espionage, and Turkish Invasion* (London-New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 113, the Acheson plan wasn't as cessionary as described by Clogg. It included "a wide range of proposals, such as partition, confederation, and resettlement, but mainly provided "double enosis," separating the two communities and unifying both with their motherlands, making everyone happy and the Americans even more, preventing possible independence that might risk possibilities of Soviet influence and getting Makarios a new Castro."

¹² The colonels justified their action as a need to prevent a forthcoming communist coup d'etat, without submitting any proof for this accusation. However, it was widely known that they wanted to defend themselves in advance for their dismissal from the army after the forthcoming and almost sure victory of the central party at the elections of the following May. Other motives can be found, such as the low morale of the officers due to low wages and the continuous intrigues and extravagance of the public wealth by the politicians (Clogg, *Short History of Modern Greece*, 183–184).

political parties, cancelled significant articles of the constitution, created military courts and exiled thousands of “leftist” ideologists to unoccupied islands. But the most significant loss for the Greeks after democracy itself was international support in dealing with the problems of the Greece/Turkey/Cyprus triangle because of the diplomatic mutilation of the country.

The worldwide outcry over the punishments and the abolishment of important freedoms isolated Greece from the international community. Thus, in December 1969, the Council of Europe almost suspended Greece from the council. Strangely, the only supporter of the Greek military coup was the American government, a factor that resulted in a number of conspiracy theories regarding the direct or indirect participation of an American faction in the coup’s establishment and maintenance. While the degree of U.S. intervention is difficult to prove, the connivance of the Greek regime was remarkable. It would have been nearly impossible to organize without some knowledge and at least implicit acceptance by the U.S. secret service.¹³

In September of 1967, the new Turkish approach to the possibility of invasion was again stopped by President Johnson.¹⁴ However, the United States not only remained the only weapons supplier for the Colonels but also tried to maintain access to the region through the already established U.S. military bases. Thus, the Pentagon did everything it

¹³ According to O’Malley and Craig, *The American Conspiracy*, not only the American secret services but also the government and State Department were absolutely informed about the situation and actually organized very carefully the military intervention, using Colonel Papadopoulos, who was fully connected with the CIA and the hub of the Greek secret services (KYP) and was known for his nationalistic past and his authoritarian ideas. The use of a military coup would negatively influence Cyprus’s balance, legalizing the Turkish invasion and making a “fall guy” of Greek anger. This theory alone does not answer the many questions discussed in subsequent chapters, however. According to Laurence Stern, in *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy* (New York Times Books, 1977), the intervention, especially that of the American embassy in Greece, was determined to encourage the military coup in order to prevent the rise of leftists and further Soviet interference in the part of Greece under American control. It was simply proof that the choice of the “wrong horse” leads the horseman to an undesired battle, a saying derived from Clausewitz.. Richard Clogg and G. Yannopoulos accept the idea of an American intervention through a military coup, but that plan concerned the king’s participation and his security and it ultimately was rejected (*Greece Under Military Rule: United States Policy in Post-War Greece*, New York: Basic Books, 1972).

¹⁴ Thanos Veremis, *The History of Greek-Turkish relations, 1453–2003*, Chapter 6, 117.

could to keep a good relationship with the Greek colonels.¹⁵ Whatever the truth about the American participation in the military dictatorship in Greece, the Greek inability to control crises and its tendency to have nationalistic, prejudiced, and inexperienced leaders would prove fatal for the people of both Cypriot communities. This disadvantage became even greater when, under President Johnson's order, the 10,000 Greek troops that were transferred to the island after the Treaty of Zurich-London withdrew from Cyprus, leaving the island defenseless.¹⁶

Meanwhile, two attempts organized by King Konstantinos to bring down the conspirators, one in 1967 with the army's support and one in 1973 with the navy's contribution, found them still both informed and prepared. These failures caused the king to flee the country.

In 1972, in an effort to increase the defense capabilities of the island, Makarios ordered a supply of Czech missiles,¹⁷ declaring by this his disengagement from the Greek military regime and its objectives for *enosis*, which he believed would change Cyprus to a province-protectorate or a resort for the members of the coup. Since Czechoslovakia, which had been under Soviet control since 1968, and many others wanted Makarios to negotiate Cyprus's acceptance into the Eastern bloc, there could be no better excuse for the Western alliance to work for his deposition.

¹⁵ According to Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece*, the United States, through President Nixon, in January 1972, professed the need of keeping good relations with Greece because of her geopolitical importance to the defense of Israel. At the same time, several American ministers paraded from Athens to present President Nixon's warm wishes and succor to the regime for its faithfulness to the NATO mandates.

¹⁶ EOKA's leader Grivas had returned to the island in 1964, and in November 1967 he attacked a Turkish village aiming to drive the Turkish minority out of Cyprus and make uniting with Greece even easier (Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece*, 194).

¹⁷ "Makarios played with fire," Kissinger said in his *Years of Upheaval* (Boston-Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1982, 1189) about Makarios's decision to install missiles. Cyprus for the Americans stood as a bad contingency of becoming the "Cuba of the Mediterranean."

The end of the coup, on 25 November 1973, came in the same way it had been established.¹⁸ A combination of armed forces put in power once again a military leader and established a new dictatorship, leaving unfulfilled the spirit of democracy for which the young students at the Technical University had tirelessly fought.

The new coup's objectives concerning the Cyprus issue were the same as their predecessors. For them, also, Makarios was an obstacle to the plans for unification with Greece, and Grivas worked hard under their orders to replace Makarios with someone who would endorse enosis. EOKA, reborn and transmuted into the EOKA B terrorist team in 1971, tried several times to kill the archbishop, but was unsuccessful.

The recent discovery of petroleum in the Aegean Sea once again evoked hostility between Greece and Turkey, bringing closer the possibility of conflict. The increasing pressure on the Makarios regime peaked on 15 July, when the Greek Cypriot National Guard, instigated by the Ioannidis'¹⁹ coup in Athens, openly confronted Makarios's forces, in an attempt to capture or even kill him. Makarios's forces were defeated, but he fled to England in a British plane.²⁰ His escape marks the final countdown for Cyprus's integrity. The leadership was taken over by Sampson, an EOKA ex-activist known to the Turks for his brutality and deadly hatred of them demonstrated by his operations in the mountainous villages.

The Turkish forces saw the leadership takeover as a green light to declare their intention to intervene according to the rights provided by the Zurich-London Treaty and the security necessary for the Turkish community. Immediately, both Greece and Turkey

¹⁸ The incident at the Technical University in the center of Athens, where a great number of students were enclosed to express opposition to the regime (according to Clogg, 34 of them died from the army's display of force) is even now a point of ambiguity. According to Clogg, the incident whipped up the civilians and ruined the coup. According to eye-witnesses, nobody died in the almost empty university and the coup that had already lost its power. It was only a matter of time before it broke down by itself.

¹⁹ Ioannidis was the Chief of the Police during the seven year coup of the Colonels and led the second coup in Greece until the first Turkish invasion.

²⁰ Makarios has been called the most ambiguous person in Hellenic history since Alkiviades, the leader of the Athenian allying forces in the Peloponnesian wars, who defected first to the opponent Spartans and later to the Persians leading a crusade against the Greek city-states. History hasn't dealt justly or blamed Alkiviades for his actions, to betray his country and fight for the enemy. Indeed, there are many today who consider Makarios a hero for resisting the Western interests for the good of Cyprus. But many more call him a traitor, accusing him of calling on the Turks to intervene and defend his power and the security of the Turkish population. However, the call to the Turks has never been proven.

ordered a military mobilization. But the Greek effort proved inefficient due to internal opposition among the officers and the disorganizing influence that both dictatorships had had on the armed forces.²¹

B. ATILLA I: THE FIRST INVASION

Early in the morning of 20 July 1974, the Turkish forces invaded Cyprus in the region of Kerynia, landing more than 6,000 soldiers and hundreds of tanks and trucks from thirty landing ships, accompanied by a great number of destroyers. The operation became known as “Attila 1.”²² Turkish paratroops joined the 650 Turkish-Cypriot fighters and sought to reach the northern part of Nicosia, so as to establish a secure road from Kerynia to the capital, and thus, create a zone that would enclose the Turkish Cypriot population. The Turkish via Turkish Prime Minister Bullet Ecevit justified the invasion as a defense against the prior Greek invasion, intended to protect both Cypriot communities and to expel Sampson’s Greek-Cypriot junta. To increase his defense capability, Sampson had ordered tanks to be moved and freed the 10,000 loyalists he had previously imprisoned.²³ Nonetheless, resistance against the Turkish forces was almost nonexistent.

The Turkish invasion caused reactions involving interested countries’ forces. The British redirected ships from the Atlantic and Mediterranean to the area and flew commandos to the Akrotiri headland in an effort to protect the 17,000 British citizens on

²¹ Only four of the twelve divisions were at war strength and these were based in northern Greece and near Athens. The mobilization took two days to be completed and was conducted mainly to protect the northeast borders and the islands in case of a simultaneous offensive (O’Malley and Craig, *The American Conspiracy*, 188–189).

²² Around 450 A.C., Attila, the brutal and catastrophic leader of the Huns, was destroying everything in his path. He acted in Balkans undefeated by the Byzantines who had to pay large amounts of gold as a “freedom taxation,” but after he directed his fierce troops toward the west and was defeated, he returned to the Hunan realm in central Europe.

²³ There are strange stories about the strong resistance of the Greek troops (O’Malley and Craig, *The American Conspiracy*, 188–189; Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece*, 199). O’Malley and Craig say that no plans were taken from the Greek National Guard when Turkish troops captured radars and that many Greek submarines and airplanes were recalled before reaching the shores of Kerynia. Clogg refers to the refusal of high-positioned officers, pretending inability, to obey Ioannidis’s orders to attack Turkey. Today, Greek-Cypriots ask why, in 2000, the UN stopped the Soviet missiles, such as the S-300 missiles, from Czechoslovakia that were never installed in Cyprus, and why, in 1967, the Greek division was recalled, gutting the defense of the island. On a guided tour along the “Green Line” in 1999, I personally heard a Greek-Cypriot officer claiming that they seven times occupied and seven times were ordered to retreat from to an important strategic point which finally was offered to the Turkish side rising questions of organized betrayal.

the island and the strategic interests that their bases offered after falsely waiting for the Americans to deter the Turks from invading. The British threatened the Turks not to injure any British citizen or damage geopolitical possession, but they had to repeat it several times before the Turkish ships let them embark with 500 foreign evacuees. Egypt and Syria also placed their armies in readiness. The American force consisted of an aircraft carrier and six destroyers carrying 1,300 Marines. The Soviets put seven airborne divisions on alert and sent ships from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. The concentration of so many forces could conclude to a dangerous escalation, causing Kissinger to contact Moscow and ask for neutrality so as to avoid a confrontation between the two superpowers.²⁴

After two days, the Turkish goal was accomplished, with its successful establishment of powers in Kerynia and its connection to the captured part of Nicosia, a region that included more than 60,000 of the Turkish population, thereby implementing a plan similar to an American contingency intervention. The Turkish casualties were high compared to the resistance they faced; however, that cannot be compared to the suffering the two communities felt and would continue to feel from those days. Many thousands of civilians died trying to escape the bombs and the fire, or abandoned their homes forever and went into hiding to escape the angry retaliations. Atrocities were committed by both sides, with no discrimination as to age or gender. Today, those are portrayed in museums, reminding us how brutal human nature can be when people act out of religious or nationalistic passions abetted by political and economic interests indifferent to the value of life. O’Malley and Ian Craig allege that Kissinger directed the escalation and also probably the invasion process,²⁵ exploiting to an absolute degree the “one-man show” that the Watergate scandal offered him. But the forthcoming downfall of the dictatorship

²⁴ Greek warships which were considered phantoms the last three days but meant Greece’s entering to war, raising Turkish flags passed through Turkish convoys approaching the shores of Cyprus and when the Turkish forces comprehended the situation they responded by sinking finally one and scrapping two other. The Turkish commanders when realized had happened were happy that they did not hit the British or American ones positioned nearby. O’Malley and Ian Craig in *The American Conspiracy: America, Espionage and Turkish Invasion* (187-193).

²⁵ “*The Turks were astonished by Kissinger’s detailed knowledge of events on the ground of Cyprus*”...Kissinger to Ecevit: “*Your bridgehead is strengthened, your reinforcements are about to land on the island, and can continue to do so after the ceasefire*” [O’Malley and Craig in *The American Conspiracy: America, Espionage and Turkish Invasion* (194)].

in Greece might have brought the leftist party into power, imperiling his plans by adding a Soviet factor to the game. However, the Greek threat to Turkey was unacceptable to the United States, the primary arms provider of both the NATO allies. And Nixon's prohibition to the contingency of war in the southeastern region of the alliance was absolute just as was Johnson's effective pressure on the Turks in 1964 and 1967.

Finally, on 23 July 1974, the coups in both Cyprus and Greece were replaced by a civilian rule having Clerides and Karamanlis, respectively, as their Prime Ministers, who were proposed and accepted because of their Western connections. The ceasefire that succeeded after three days of bombing and threats, however, proved ineffective for subsequent Turkish plans.

C. ATILLA II: THE SECOND INVASION



Figure 2. Map of Cyprus during the first and second Turkish invasion.²⁶

On 13 and 14 August 1974, the Turkish forces began a second invasion, which extended to the east and west and captured the entirety of north Cyprus. Three hundred tanks with 40,000 soldiers headed toward the eastern and western cities, supported by thirty warships and covered by air protection. This force succeeded in conquering one

²⁶ Henry Kissinger, *The Years of Renewal* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999, 220.

third of the island, from the city of Lefka to the west to Famagusta in the east, passing through the northern part of Nicosia. When the Greek Cypriots began to lose their positions in Nicosia, the Turkish soldiers moved to encircle the city and take control of the airport, simultaneously blocking the exit of the British bases in Dhekelia. However, more than 24,000 civilians, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, thinking that the Turkish advance would stop outside the walls, entered the two British bases seeking protection. A significant Turkish power was detached from the fight over Famagusta and redirected to Dhekelia, threatening the future of the British base. This situation provoked the British administration in both Cyprus and Britain, which, threatened by the confrontation, put their forces on alert and took an offensive position. The Turks, faced with the British decision to protect their sovereignty at the base, pulled their forces back, thereby avoiding a conflict that would have encouraged Greece's engagement in the war. Greece hesitated because of its isolation, and the difficulty involved in bringing together the parts of its army, scattered after the fall of the dictatorship, kept her away.

In Athens, Karamanlis was infuriated. Four hours after the second invasion began, Greece was out of NATO's alliance, which was useless in any case, since it could not, or did not want to, defend Greece's sovereignty and rights. The Greek officers had already abandoned the NATO headquarters in Naples and Brussels. A great number of people gathered in the center of Athens around the American embassy, protesting "treason" and "murder," aimed specifically at Kissinger's manipulations. A similar uproar in the United States and all over Greece did not affect Greece's reluctance to enter the war, a war that would ultimately cost the Greek Cypriots 16,000 casualties, 4,000 killed, and 1,619 who are still missing today.²⁷

The Turkish partition of Cyprus uprooted and forced 200,000 Greek Cypriots to the south and imprisoned 60,000 Turkish Cypriots there whose misfortune was not a matter of interest to or negotiations by the Turks. Later, under Turkish threats to expel the

²⁷ The Turkish casualties are estimated to have been around 1,000; 800 are supposed missing. Both sides deny imprisoning people during the invasion. However, almost ten years after the invasion, pictures from Turkish prisons – illegally published by Turkish journalists – show many of those said to be missing. They were recognized by family members, which once again roused the anger of the Greek Cypriot community.

few remaining Greek Cypriots from the north to the south, the Turkish Cypriots were transferred north, thereby accomplishing the Turkish plan to change the population distribution of the island forever.

A ceasefire was agreed to on 16 August, but only after American pressure on the increased Turkish disposition to continue south and capture nearly the whole island. Ecevit now declared he was ready to continue negotiations in Geneva with the advantage that the invasion, now an accomplished fact, gave him. At the same time, the Greeks blamed NATO for not intervening, for not providing a deterrent to the Turks, for not having pressed them for an agreement at the previous Geneva meeting on 8 August, for having blueprinted the partition of Cyprus (by the Pentagon and the CIA) back in 1967, and since, for having edited the contingency plan which provided exactly the same partition in the current situation.²⁸

The second invasion closed the book of blood in Cyprus's history without, however, resolving the problems that created the conflict and without making the life of the people of both communities better. The historical review indicates the problematic environment that Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots lived in since the early years of 20th century, leaving unanswered, though, questions of why low scale street fights concluded to actions of terrorism by armed groups against civilians, to direct intervention of the Greek military coup and the Turkish invasion, undeterred from the international system for more than 14 years.

This question is the focus of the following chapters starting with a review of theoretical approaches at the phenomena of ethno-nationalism, ethnic conflict, and the implementation of these theories in the Cypriot crisis, which comes in the next chapter.

²⁸ Andreas Papandreou, according to O'Malley and Craig, *The American Conspiracy*, 216–221.

III. THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND THE ETHNONATIONAL REALITY

This chapter addresses the theoretical aspect of the Cyprus conflict, through the definition of terms like ethnic conflict and ethno-nationalism, and through different schools of thoughts with respect to how these phenomena are related to the conflict in Cyprus. It also discusses the ethno-national character of Cyprus and evaluates the contribution of this character to the evolution of the crisis into conflict. This evaluation intends to distinguish the ethnic dimension of the Cypriot problem from the reasons that caused the conflict and argue that the conflict should not be considered to an ethnic conflict.

In the literature related to the years of crisis, Cyprus is aptly characterized as an orphan with three midwives, Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain,²⁹ because of the guardianship stipulated in the London-Zurich agreement. The way those countries interpreted and manipulated their assigned guardianship had a critical influence on future events because, from the very beginning, they served their own interests. Since the agreement benefited all three, more or less, it was expected and reasonable that they would not set aside controversy for the good of Cyprus.

What was not reasonable, however, is that the agreement process did not include the country it was created for. Cyprus was completely absent from the negotiations that would resolve its problems. Apparently, the three guardian countries did not consider them Cyprus's problems. In other words, Cyprus was treated merely as a physical or, more accurately, as a geographical entity. The negotiators paid no attention to Cyprus's ethnonational distinctiveness. This raises the question, Why then did they not divide the island into three parts with each guardian country assigned one part, according to the affected population's preference, strategic needs, economic perspective, and other related reasons?

²⁹ Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Cyprus: International Law and the Prospects for Settlement, April 1991, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1991.

Since that apparently proved unfeasible, they began negotiations in London intending to ease the Greco-Turkish rivalry by appointing a British arbitrator and maintaining the British influence in the area. How mistaken their belief was – that the Cyprus crisis was an extension of Greco-Turkish rivalry – would eventually become obvious. The solution they subsequently reached, however, giving Cyprus its independence, seems to have been considered irrelevant to their initial negotiations, as does the substance of the negotiations, which, in effect, created an unstable and unreliable regime.

Nonetheless, the London-Zurich agreement gave independence to more than half a million people and created a new state with a new constitution. It established institutions and public services and designated a president and a vice president to lead the newly created democracy. How difficult would it have been to invite them to also participate in the settlement? How paradoxical would it have been – if Greece, Turkey, and England had agreed – to create a democracy in consultation with the domestic leaders who understood the unique character of the region? The foreign powers not only denied the Cyprus leaders participation in the settlement, but also instigated a series of treaties that set limits on Cyprus's independence, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of the new republic. In addition, the foreign powers were granted the right to station military forces on Cyprus's territory and interfere in its domestic affairs.³⁰

Some might argue that, since neither of the Cypriot communities, the Greek Cypriots or the Turkish Cypriots, wanted to negotiate or compromise, because both demanded all, it was right that an external and objective agent should decide their destiny. However, if the communities, that is, the general populace, could not compromise out of instinct and prejudice, their leaders could have. And the external powers might have convinced them to do so. In addition, any excuse by the three guarantors, Greece, Turkey, and Britain, that they were indirectly involved parties to the settlement because of historical, religious, tribal, or regional reasons was not sufficient to justify their exclusion of the Cypriots, the direct inheritors of those heavy legacies.

³⁰ Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1997), 24.

This is especially true of Greece and Turkey, whose recent history demonstrated that, for both countries, terms such as nation and state coincide. No one expected them to be neutral partners. The continual changing of the border between Greece and Turkey and their common bloody history was evident in the rhetoric demanding that many external nationals be included inside the Cypriot state's boundaries. That rhetoric, not surprisingly, created a syndrome of localism and aggressiveness, rather than one of "self-determination" and "state formation."³¹ It is important here to clarify that both of the communities in Cyprus wanted to be unified with their motherland and viewed that unification as an implicit process. Since the agreement in London specified a new state as the only solution,³² the negotiators should have invited Cypriot representatives to participate in the process.

On the other hand, any new state, in order to legitimize its existence, must be approved by the international community. A self-determination process is not enough. The best example of this was the northern part of Cyprus, occupied by the Turkish invasion, which was never recognized as legal, and reeling between corruption and the absence of corruption. An agreement among Greece, Turkey, and Britain gave worldwide legality to the new state, Cyprus. Some years earlier, during the Greek Cypriots' decolonization struggle, when the Turkish interests over the Turkish community were insignificant, the international community through the UN was not consistent in its treatment of any new formation which they thought would endanger the global balance. If there had been international support then, Cyprus would now be part of Greece.

The international status quo was not just important before the independence of Cyprus. The years of crisis were affected by the Cold War atmosphere and the dangerous changes in the balance among the various sides. The small, independent island of Cyprus could not survive the ethnic tension derived from Greece and Turkey without a superpower's intervention. Once the Cypriot president decided to pick a side to support, the conflict became generalized and took on a new dimension. Although the great nuclear

³¹ State formation demands a strong will expressed through a strong regime. Greece and Turkey had neither a strong democracy nor a strong dictatorship. Their limited and immature political ideologies could not create or protect the newly created, unstable Cypriot constitution.

³² No case for any annexation was acceptable to all sides.

fear may have decreased after 1962, alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact were willing to allow the other to achieve further enlargement and recruitment. The Cypriot “estate” especially was appraised even higher due to its location at the intersection of three continents and in the vicinity of the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and the Suez Canal.

A. ETHNONATIONALISM³³ AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON

Ethnicity has been a factor in state-building since the emergence of modern Europe.³⁴ Ethnic and multiethnic groups searching for self-determination, especially right after two catastrophic wars, created states that were investing in and cultivating national consciences. Eastern Europe, which mainly lagged behind, according to contemporary political state-building theories, institutionalized ethnic identities and religious mandates as basic principles of the new states.

In the same way, Greece and Turkey rebuilt their post-WWII states within a framework of national integration. On the one hand, the Greeks, after successfully using their national instinct in the struggle against the Axis powers, were rewarded with territorial and population expansion. This enhanced the Greek appetite, despite the ethnic disunion³⁵ of the 1946–49 civil war. Old Greeks were joining the enlarged state, bringing their fortunes, except those in Cyprus and North Epirus (South Albania).³⁶ On the other hand, the Turks established Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s “New Turkey” in 1923 on a secular, religion-free national foundation. After WWII and Turkey’s hesitance to choose sides in the war, its loss of benefits when everyone else was sharing the gains of victory, awakened the nationalist imagination once again in regard to Turkey’s foreign policy. So by the end of WWII, both Greece and Turkey had established weak democracies with

³³ “Ethno-nationalism” is a phenomenon based on feelings of nationalism but it is expressed by those seeking to establish or re-establish their own states” (Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*, 5).

³⁴ Ibid., 4.

³⁵ The ethno-national conscience was responsible even for the civil war. The fight was characterized as being “more and less national.”

³⁶ The expansive ambitions for Albania and Cyprus seemed more feasible because the dreams of the old, lost countries in Istanbul and Minor Asia seemed now out of reach.

indistinct civil-military relations and a limited political power. More specifically, their religious and national principles consisted of the basic articles of their constitutions,³⁷ which served to preserve the uniqueness of their national goals.

This same ethnonational construction was transferred to Cyprus, filling the communities there with hope for *enosis*, unification with Greece and Turkey, and, by that double unification, partition of the island, respectively. Those hopes were not the product of nationalism and hatred of the other, but rather a fear of being isolated and conquered by the other. For the Greek Cypriots, it was fear that the great distance from Greece was creating and the burden of Turkey's proximity. For the Turkish Cypriots, it was fear of being absorbed into the island's unification with Greece.

The independence of 1960 gave a new and cohesive direction to both communities, challenging those who declared war because of national prejudice, but only until the motherlands renewed their interference in the island's public life. The ethnonationalism of both Greece and Turkey was enhanced by the multiple dictatorships that captured the reins of their countries. Furthermore, "with the collapse of the political system and the eclipse of ideology which bound ethnically different people, old rivalries re-emerge and neighbors become again antagonists."³⁸ Those evolutions enhanced the politicization of the nationalistic ideology and widened the boundaries of the dispute. Then any interaction between domestic and internal factors just speeded up the conflict and closed the diplomatic path to compromise.

The antipathetic relation between Greece and Turkey includes hundreds of controversies dating back hundreds of years, from Byzantium's wane until the Greek revolutionary war for independence in 1821, many unsuccessful wars, and the 1897, 1912–14, and 1919–23 wars. During the in-between periods, however, the coexisting populations showed a noticeable peaceful capability which tended to break down again only under ethno-political pressure. The feeling of separatism that always exists among

³⁷ The basic articles have not yet changed, but the political orientations and their degree of maturity have.

³⁸ Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*, 3.

different-race people and the centralism among same-race people inside their neighborhoods are not an index of disputing interaction, but of conciliating acceptance of variety.

B. ETHNONATIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS IN CYPRUS

It is wrong to think that the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus disagreed with what their motherlands as national entities were expressing. The Greek Cypriots' and Turkish Cypriots' stands were exactly like their fellow populations in Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, local character differences usually have to do with distance, making people from distant locations seem different. But what binds people strongly with their motherland is a shared ethnic identity, including language and religion. In the case of Cyprus, however, religion was mainly a social phenomenon whose influence in the crisis was insignificant because it did not promote important changes. The great ethno-political changes in both motherlands were directly reflected in and magnified by the communities of the island.

This enduring connection with Greece and Turkey favored separatism between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and contributed to an eventual eruption in the eastern Mediterranean that could not be controlled by either Greece or Turkey alone. Our reference to the ethnonational elements is not intended to imply, however, that the crisis was a result of nationalism. The ethnic ties were preexistent and very important. However, the influence of domestic nationalism on the crisis was small compared to the “imported” nationalism and international interests.

Ethnic ties did play a distinct and significant role in the national conscience of the Cypriots., and thus, they had to be taken into consideration by anyone who wanted to use those ties for their own purposes, or anyone who intends to study the unique physiognomy of the island for scientific reasons. In the following discussion, therefore, we will explore some of the significant features and causes of that Cypriot separatism.³⁹

First, even though Cyprus was an independent state after 1960, none of the involved parties considered it so. The Greek Cypriots were still fighting for *enosis*, and

³⁹ Committee on Foreign Relations, *Cyprus: International Law and the Prospects for Settlement*, 28–29.

the Turkish Cypriots, for partition. And both Turkey and Greece considered Cyprus as either an extension of their national borders or, better still, a distant province. Their rhetoric was echoed automatically by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot populations. In addition, in a display of their awareness of the Greek and Turkish position, the Cypriots flew the Greek and Turkish flags during their national celebrations instead of that of Cyprus. *The national anthems were a point of segregation as well.* In addition, education on the island was based on the educational system⁴⁰ of the motherlands, and because there was no university on the island, students were leaving. As a result, during the years of crisis, there was no common national Cyprus-oriented aspiration, experience, or ethnic unanimity to bind the two communities together and help preserve Cyprus's cohesion.

A second important factor that undermined the foundation of Cyprus as an independent state was the demographics of the minorities. It is important to remember that the Turkish Cypriots comprised the biggest minority, one fifth, of the population, which automatically gave them more rights than the other minorities. This was the case not only on Cyprus but also in Greece and Turkey, where they comprised only 2 percent of those populations. Strong minorities can demand a share in a country's opportunities like the rest of the population. And they recognize the strength that comprising a significant percentage gives them in influencing administrative and economic issues. On the other hand, to the majority, 20 percent is so much smaller than 50 percent that it is considered only minimal, or even nonexistent. Such demographic factors make the state formation process even harder, because institutions and principles are subject to negotiation. This was especially the case in Cyprus, where the Turkish Cypriots,

⁴⁰ An educational system that promotes antagonism from both sides and teaches how bad the neighbors are. Remember the time when soccer and basketball teams from Greece and Turkey met in European leagues and the game became a battle between the young, even student, fans at the rows? Who teaches and perpetuates this violence? Probably school.

following Turkey's recommendations, were more intransigent in discussions in their attempt to gain more than the Greek Cypriots.⁴¹

As a solution then, a federal system with only two constituent parts seems dangerous, because federalism works better in a large, more diverse environment, where groupings vary from time to time, as in the United States, Australia, and Canada. When there are only two unequal constituents, the system tends to break down, as it did in Pakistan.⁴²

Another aspect that contributed to the distinctive ethnonational configuration in Cyprus was the presence of the UN. During the post-invasion period, the UN maintained peace in the island, but it did almost nothing to deter the corruption of the emerging state during the years of crisis. If the presence of the UN, which was more political than military, had been decisive and more of a deterrent in the three years preceding the invasion, the low-scale, ethnic-type street fights might have been prevented. However, no blame can be charged to the UN troops, since they were not prepared to fight against an army and deter the Turkish invasion. In any case, as we will attempt to show, the international political background of the crisis played a more catalytic role than the ethnic predisposition of the disputed communities.⁴³

C. WHY THE CONFLICT IN CYPRUS WAS NOT LIKE OTHER ETHNIC CONFLICTS

The definition of the term “ethnic conflict” is very wide and includes many different types of intrastate conflicts. The variety of definitions, though, according to

⁴¹ State-building in Cyprus resembled the problematic state formation in Africa and the Middle East in the post-colonial period and in the Balkans and central Asia in the post-Cold War period. When the protecting power withdrew its interest from the colonial state, the inherited administration could not be run by the newly emerging state without an infrastructure, especially when asserted by varying strong parties. Similarly, the end of the Cold War left behind guns and uncontrolled power for the tribes and insurgents that helped a superpower keep the state aligned. The arbitrary construction of their boundaries by external powers, the lack of societal cohesion, their recent emergence into juridical statehood, and their stage of economic and political development ... demonstrate the political, economic, and social characteristics of a weak state (Mohammed Ayoob, *State Making, State Building, and State Failure*, Chapter 9 in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* Washington D.C, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 128.

⁴² Ibid., 127.

⁴³ I insist that any type of ethnic confrontation in Cyprus was sporadic and just eased the international political manipulations of the facts. Wide-scale episodes and conflicts followed by ethnic cleansing like those in the former Yugoslav republics are, without fail, “ethnic conflicts.”

personal interpretations, can exclude the conflict in Cyprus from the ethnic type conflicts or include it into them. Again, this thesis argues that, even if the Cyprus crisis involved an ethnic controversy, the final result was configured by the intervention of foreign interests. This argument parallels a popular debate among scholars, who distinguish theories of ethnic conflict into two camps: “primordialists” and “instrumentalists”⁴⁴. “Primordialists contend that ethnic identities have deep historical roots and change little over time,” leading to expectations that ethnic conflicts really are about ethnicity. “Instrumentalists contend that political elites play decisive role in constructing and shaping ethnic identities and that their actions are driven largely, if not entirely by their political and economic self-interests.” The effort to demonstrate the exclusion of the conflict in Cyprus from ethnic conflict is consistent with the instrumentalist approach; it will suggest a category of that solution to the problem that would disregard the ethnic rivalry and would invest Cyprus’s future in strong political and economic bonds of interdependence between the confronted communities.

The conflict in Cyprus had a number of characteristics that distinguish it from other ethnic conflicts. These include such aspects as international political interests and inherent societal predispositions, both of which influenced a sequence of crisis events and affected their conclusion. At this point, before we examine each country’s contribution, one at a time, it is important to understand what made the ethnic conflict in Cyprus a special case and to examine whether it was even an actual ethnic conflict. To do this, from the many well-known international ethnic conflicts – the wars in Somalia, Bosnia, Lebanon, Chechnya, Congo, Rwanda, etc. – we chose the conflict in the former Yugoslav republic because of its geographical and tribal similarity to Cyprus.

Ethnic conflicts often involve a direct confrontation between an ethnic minority (or minorities) and a national army, even if the army has only recently been created, such as was the case in the former Yugoslavia. In Cyprus, before the invasion, there had been no collision between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot troops. Instead, the fights were

⁴⁴ Michael E. Brown, *Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and Implications* Chapter 13 in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 209.

indirect, aimed at civilians by terrorist groups. TMT from the Turkish side and EOKA B, the reformation of EOKA, – with the same leader and same fighters, but different tactics and targets – evolved, that is, from a revolutionary team working for self-determination into a terrorist group with hard nationalistic language, were unpredictable, inflamed by a spirit of revenge, and much disapproved of by the general public. During the days of the invasion, atrocities and acts of revenge were committed throughout the island by all sides. It was an actual war, which was different from the usual conflicts, even though it only lasted a few hours.

In Cyprus at the time, there was no political cohesion that could be expressed as solidarity in a national fight, rather than simply support for Makarios's attempts at a peaceful solution. Clerides and Vassiliou, the leaders of different Greek Cypriot parties, both disapproved of Makarios's decisions and wanted him to withdraw, though for different reasons. Moreover, the leftists in both parts of Cyprus contested the national struggle.

A few days before the Turkish invasion, a civil war arose between the Greek National Guard forces under Grivas, backed by a military coup in Greece, and the Greek Cypriot forces supporting President Makarios. More Greek Cypriots were killed during this civil war than by either the TMT (the Turkish military organization which was created to fight against the Greek-Cypriot revolutionary struggle) or during the Turkish invasion. More than 10,000 Greek Cypriots were imprisoned for ideological reasons for a few days, until the invasion, when they were freed to defend their country. However, the TMT fighters also murdered many Turkish Cypriots, who objected to their plans to resurrect Turkish nationalism and excise all Greek elements from their culture and traditions.⁴⁵ This phenomenon may have been unique; it certainly does not fit the usual definition of an ethnic conflict.

Another aspect that differentiates the Cyprus crisis from the war in Yugoslavia has to do with the duration of the war. It was not the total defeat of the Greek Cypriot defense that stopped the war, but rather the foreign, that is, American intervention (to be

⁴⁵ Costas Yennaris, *From the East* (London & Bath: Elliot & Thompson, 1999), 141.

discussed more fully in the next chapter). Usually, ethnic conflicts, because of their sectarian basis which extends the time of the war, take some time to recover from. Furthermore, there were enough arms available in Cyprus and Greece to continue an ethnic struggle, but not a conspiracy or an orderly partition of the island.

In ethnic conflicts, armies take control of the military action from the societies that have authorized and promoted the conflict. National hatreds and aversions turn diverse segments of a society into aggressive groups – raised either by conscription or by a “vote of confidence” – that then reciprocate in turn to confrontational challenges. The terror exerted toward the Turks and the Greeks by EOKA B and the TMT, respectively, did not evoke respect and psychological support for their actions.

Assaults against civilians in isolated undefended villages in Cyprus constituted genocide, regardless of the number of casualties or the size of the international outcry. Furthermore, such crimes are usually kept secret for some time. The only difference between Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia is that, in Cyprus, most of the atrocities were not committed by national armies but by EOKA B and TMT terrorists. That said, there is no excuse, of course, for the crimes committed during the invasion by the Turkish soldiers against the trapped north-Cyprus Greek Cypriot civilians and the retaliation by Greek Cypriot soldiers and civilians against the Turkish Cypriot civilians caught in the south of Cyprus.

In most ethnic conflicts, the international community is usually either indifferent or silent during the crisis and does not intervene until it becomes a full-blown war. Contrarily, in Cyprus, the international intervention was determinative to the evolution of events and then totally passive during the war, which erupted at the invasion. In short, the crisis in Cyprus was a denouement of economic, political, and strategic competition, rather than ethnic aversion. Usually, in ethnic conflicts, constituent characteristics such as a common national identity or a religious passion are enough to spur dissention. Both of those existed in Cyprus, as secondary influences, but also primary excuses to be ascribed to.

Sometimes ethnic conflicts are financed and supported with arms by external powers with mutual national or religious roots. However, in our case, Greece and Turkey cannot be considered external powers, whose nationality and religion coincided with the respective Cyprus communities, because those were just part of the total island populace. Thus, they were not like the Croats and the Bosnians, who were armed and trained to fight the Serbs; the Algerians, who found support and resources in Morocco and Egypt to fight against the French; or the Iraqis, who were supported and armed by the United States to fight the Iranians. It is also important to point out that the great number of Soviet arms that reached Cyprus were used mainly by the conflicting civil groups, and not so much either against the Turkish Cypriots or for defense against the Turkish troops during the invasion.

Religious fanaticism is often a major factor enhancing national expectations and ambitions, even in democratic states. Religious leaders many times lead the national struggle for peoples' rights, thereby sanctifying using the means of war and its necessary informalities. However, in Cyprus, after 1960, the senior religious representative was also the president of the independent state. During his presidency and earlier, President, and Archbishop, Makarios, took a temperate position compared to Grivas and the rightwing parties that were fighting for *enosis*. Eventually, Makarios's argument with the nationalistic fighters of EOKA B was responsible for assaults against his life and a military coup in Cyprus. As regards the Turkish Cypriot side, the religious influences kept a low profile⁴⁶ and did not play an important role in the crisis.

A long-lasting coexistence of diverse groups under the same, self-administrative state often encourages the development of disagreements and even rival sentiments. Bosnia, for example, was less violent under Austrian, Turkish, and Communist rule than when its constituent ethnic groups were asked to create a multiethnic state.⁴⁷ Independent multiethnic states often lose cohesion and collapse when the balance among the counter-tendency forces change. Likewise, Cyprus under British administration after 1925 was

⁴⁶ The New Turks movement in the early twentieth century dominated Turkey and separated religion from the political, making Turkey's government secular in an Islamic country.

⁴⁷ Henry Kissinger, *The Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 195.

more peaceful than after its independence in 1960. The speed with which an independent Cyprus collapsed, after only three years, however, indicates that there were other, accelerating factors at work than those generally found to contribute to ethnic conflicts.

Some might claim that, even if international intervention was critical and an accessory to the conflict, this does not mean that the Cyprus conflict was not ethnic in nature, because ethnic tensions do not always conclude in the collision of the constituent groups involved in the crisis. But in the case of Cyprus, the disruptive tensions were not the product of the communities' antipathy toward one another. What was viewed from the outside as an internal conflict was actually an illegal conflict consisting of actions by terrorists on both sides that lacked any social or political support. Furthermore, the acts of separatism were preparing the way for a Turkish invasion and the acts of expulsion which followed, intended to legitimize the use of force and what the military means had gained.

In light of the many characteristics of ethnic conflicts described above, it is hard to equate the Cypriot crisis and the opposing ethnic tensions that challenged Cyprus's viability with the Yugoslavian and other ethnic wars. If the ethnic rivalry was strong enough to quickly cause the abolition of the constitution, the opposing communities would have been at war much earlier and no one would have agreed to create a free and independent state.

In the next chapter, we will attempt to consider more analytically both internal and external factors in order to determine whether the war in 1974, which either caused or was an excuse for the Turkish invasion, was inevitable or the result of a chain reaction of events.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

IV. HOW INTERNATIONAL POWERS, THE TWO MOTHERLANDS, DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, CIVIL WARS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS INFLUENCED THE CRISIS

A. THE INTERNATIONAL POWERS: GREAT BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE SOVIET UNION

The interference of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union in the crisis in Cyprus determined more than the evolution of events and the invasion itself, because the Cyprus issue also involved the international political problems of Greece and Turkey. Great Britain, as one of those who established the administration and those who were stipulated by the London-Zurich agreement as guarantors of the constitution, was largely responsible for the increase of agitation among the Cypriot population and the first skirmishes. Their responsibility ended, however, with the Turkish fleet's departure from the Turkish coast.

Although neither the United States nor the Soviet Union used force to either deter or enforce violent action, their most serious involvement began during the invasion. Their less direct intervention in the crisis began, however, long before July 1974. The U.S. secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, deserves the lion's share of the responsibility. Before 1963, the crisis in Cyprus, because of its Cold War context, brings to mind the Cuban nuclear missile crisis. However, the tone of the dispute remained low-key and a superpower confrontation was avoided. But the diplomatic manipulations that followed are a subject of much study because of their speed, their implementation, and, especially, their complexity.

1. Great Britain

Even in its early years of colonization, Great Britain did not view Cyprus as a primary target of its policy of expansion. In any case, neither Britain's resources nor its size promised a successful outcome to its grandiose ambitions. Because of its strategic location, however, Cyprus was always an important outpost that Britain relied on in ways that aided its control and supported its other missions.



Figure 3. The British Prime Minister in 1974: Harold Wilson.⁴⁸

The successful outcome of the Second World War left Great Britain with a nice heritage in the Middle East, the Suez was ripe for exploitation, and Cyprus played a key role in the region. However, the WWII victory was also accompanied by waves of nationalism and ethnic assertion around Europe, especially in such strategic nodal areas as the Suez Canal and the Middle East. A heightened sense of nationalism in Egypt after Gamal Abdel Nasser's coup in 1954 constrained the British from transferring their headquarters to the militarily poorly structured Cyprus. From their headquarters in Cyprus, the British controlled units in Jordan, Iraq, and Libya. In addition, Cyprus was upgraded to host an M-16 missile system which controlled additional M-16 systems in Beirut, Tel Aviv, Amman, Jeddah, Baghdad, Tehran, Basra, Damascus, Cairo, and Port Said. The island also housed a British early-warning radar system and electronic spying stations. By 1955, Britain's Akrotiri base was considered the best-controlled territory between the British home-base in England and the Far East. In general, Cyprus was also the most important station operationally of British intelligence,⁴⁹ though that operability

⁴⁸ Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harold_Wilson. (May 2007).

⁴⁹ Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage, and Turkish Invasion* (London, NY: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 6–7). As the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden said, “No Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in Britain. It is as simple as that.”

was challenged in the war for the Suez Canal in August 1956, as it was the starting point for all the British and French operations.

With the Baghdad Pact of 1955 between Great Britain, Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan, major oil sources were secured, at least for a time. But maintaining control in the area required keeping Cyprus and reclaiming the Suez Canal. Great Britain's intention to keep Cyprus was challenged by an ethnic Greek Cypriot "revolutionary war," and reclaiming the Suez Canal demanded the help of military support from the United States, France, and Israel. Although the U.S. economic and personnel support never came to much, the American's blockage of Britain's right to IMF funds left the British economy in critical condition.⁵⁰ Therefore, operations under the British, French, and Israelis against Egypt were abandoned, and the regime's control over the Suez Canal returned to almost its previous condition. The resulting new balance of power in the region gave even greater importance to Cyprus and increased the need to keep it under control.

One of the significant factors that influenced Cyprus's future under British administration was the EOKA's resistance to British control which had already started. The EOKA not only tried to rid Cyprus of British rule, but also turned against the British and French troops operating in Suez. From the very first day of that war, there were bombings and offensives against camps and soldiers in Nicosia, and against naval and storage facilities, pipelines, and vehicles in Famagusta, Limassol, and Paphos. General Grivas led the EOKA struggle, using both direct and indirect confrontation methods that caused significant losses to the British forces. Many French and British airplanes were hit during landings and take-offs by this unpredictable and unexpected enemy, making operations in Suez even more difficult. Sabotage operations in Cyprus, especially bombings of Britain's Akrotiri airbase, managed to delay the action in Suez for about two weeks. By the end of operations in Suez, more than 174 separate bombs had been launched against British military targets and 124 bombs had struck vehicles and structures, raising the number of British losses to a higher level than during the operation against Egypt itself.⁵¹

⁵⁰ O'Malley and Craig, 45.

⁵¹ Ibid., 41–45.

The British failure in Suez signaled a new perspective for the future for both Cypriot and British bases. The Greek Cypriot struggle to disengage Cyprus from British administration, which was orchestrated by Greece, threatened not only Great Britain's stay on the island but also by extension its interests in the Middle East.

Britain's WW II promise, still unfulfilled, to support a Greek Cypriot administration and ease the island's *enosis* with Greece pushed Greece to demand its rights from the UN. The first step in the British countermeasures against the *enosis* struggle was its effort to block the UN process.⁵² However, such actions often result in a reaction. When their attempt to gain the much desired disengagement through legal channels was unsuccessful, the Greek Cypriots shifted their endeavors to illegal measures against British rule.

In a domino effect, the second, more disastrous step in Britain's attempt to maintain control was essentially a "divide and rule" tactic. Using the existing local ethnic differences to the maximum, they managed to awaken the nationalist sentiments of the island's Turkish population and attempted to conscript them against the Greeks. Citing "Turkish intolerance" at the 29 August 1955 conference in London, Anthony Eden, the British prime minister, attempted to determine Cyprus's future. In response, Turkish newspapers reported those "threatening speeches" and warlike scenarios. In Cyprus, the British security forces imposed restrictions and penalties to maintain security, creating an auxiliary police force made up entirely of Turkish Cypriots.⁵³ Thus, for the first time, EOKA fighters found themselves positioned against the Turkish Cypriot people, thereby creating a new dimension in the war.

Britain's coercive interference, which included an ambitious plan to illegitimately supply guns to Turkish civilians, was done under the cover of their supposed need to defend themselves against Greek fighters. From that time on, the fight against the foreign

⁵² It was the Greek Prime Minister Averoff who contacted Grivas in Cyprus and passed him the American falling away from backing due to the Greek side's attempts to gain in the Cyprus issue through the UN and the hard way that Grivas was running the events in Cyprus. (O'Malley and Craig, 50). The General Committee of the UN voted against Cyprus's inclusion on the agenda for Fall 1955 because the United States, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Norway, and France voted against it. Theodoros Couloumbis, *United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), 29.

⁵³ O'Malley and Craig, 21–22.

occupiers was transformed into a fight against a legal peace force with new rights, requirements, flags, and ideology.⁵⁴ The British intelligence agency was primarily responsible for instigating this violent ethnic dimension into the rules of the game. Scotland Yard experts were assigned to gather and train Turkish Cypriots, and to pay them attractive salaries and encourage them to leave their current occupations. Special training took place in Turkey and Kenya. Thus, by the end of 1956, more than six hundred Turkish Cypriots comprised a TMT special force, which was recognized and commanded, not by the Cypriot police chief, but by a “Scottish Effendi.”⁵⁵ In this way, a secret military organization was conscripted and trained to take on the burden of defending British interests in Cyprus, thereby preventing a general British or global outcry.

A few days after the first fights between the EOKA and the TMT on Cyprus, the British ambassador declared that a “new ‘Frankenstein’ “ had been created “by Britain’s encouragement of Turkish involvement in shaping Cyprus’s future, … whose control would be impossible. For this interference, history will no doubt hold Great Britain accountable for the wrong it did in Cyprus.”⁵⁶

The British could have chosen a different path: they could have successfully maintained both their bases in Cyprus and their control over the Middle East; they could even have ceded Cyprus to Greece. But that would have disappointed Turkey, a partner in the Baghdad Pact, which had redrawn their Eastern interests in land and access to oil. Instead, Britain decided to embroil both communities in conflict by awakening Turkish nationalism and “washing its hands” of what happened next. Thus, the confrontation became an ethnic conflict, inflaming the communities with the passion and feelings of revenge. Inevitably, since the conflict did not involve national armies, but only armed groups, sooner or later the ethnic rivalry would be directed against civilians, especially in

⁵⁴ “Apart from periods of truce, the Greek-Cypriots had for three years been shooting British soldiers in the back. The natural sympathy of the (British) army as a whole inevitably with the Turks, who were as loyal, courageous allies, sharing the same dangers in pursuit of the common enemy – EOKA” (Costas Yennaris, *From the East* [London & Bath: Elliot & Thompson, 1999]), 142.

⁵⁵ For analytical narratives of how the British recruited young Turkish Cypriot or Turkish men for the war against EOKA, see Yennaris, 127–131.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 131.

the undefended villages. Attacks against civilians, however, are crimes of terrorism, making EOKA a terrorist group, despite its initial intention to promote revolutionary ideas, self-determination, and moral principles.

Even Britain's Prime Minister Eden himself soon realized that the Turkish embroilment in Cyprus's future created an explosive recipe for disaster.⁵⁷ While the agitation within the Cypriot communities and the fights between the terrorist groups and civilians had a very low profile compared to other more well-known "ethnic conflicts," they provided a sufficient basis for Greek and Turkish exploitation in support of their offensive plans against one another. In other words, while the nature of the conflict did not change and acquire traditional ethnic-conflict characteristics, it did provide a basis for further intervention and blame by all the other interested countries.

The British contribution to the ethnic rivalry of the island culminated with the constitution of 1960 in the Treaty of London-Zurich where they, following past practice, introduced the power-sharing model. Earlier in Lebanon, the British had created a power sharing administration that consisted of a Maronite President, a Sunni prime minister, a Shia speaker of parliament, and which had to have six Christians to every five Muslims. Later in Belfast, the British appointed a Protestant chief executive besides a Catholic deputy chief executive and a Cabinet apportioned according to the two-to-one Protestant majority in the province. As the Cyprus model failed in 1963 and broke down with the Greek coup's intervention and the Turkish invasion, the "Belfast model collapsed under the strain of the working-class Protestant opposition" and the Lebanese model collapsed "when Muslim-Maronite friction and foreign interference became so intense that parliament could no longer elect a president."⁵⁸

For that exploitation of the sensitive ethnic distinctiveness of the region and given the ethnic character the crisis acquired, Great Britain could be charged as an accessory to a moral crime. Britain could also be charged for its efforts in blocking Greece's attempt to resolve the problem through the UN and for its indifferent and passive stance during

⁵⁷ O'Malley and Craig, 23.

⁵⁸ Robert Fisk *Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon* (New York, Atheneum 1990), 67-68.

both the establishment of a Greek coup in Cyprus and the Turkish invasion. It was guilty also of counteracting several NATO mandates and interests in the area. Britain's unilateral manipulations destabilized the region, transferred the Cold War practices and climate into a sensitive, inflexible environment, and raised opposing assertions at a time and in an area that, as the years have shown, they could no longer handle alone.

2. The United States

The United States was not involved either in the military operations during the Cyprus crisis or with any of the official public statements and recommendations. However, the evolution of events satisfied considerable U.S. interests and U.S. manipulations dominated the political and diplomatic field. Thus, apart from the NATO superpower's actions during the Cold War era and Cyprus's obvious strategic importance, many sources and documents denounce the U.S. interference in the conflict, which lasted from early 1960 until its conclusion in 1974.



Figure 4. The American Secretary of the State in 1974: Henry Kissinger.⁵⁹

Of course, the Turkish invasion which resulted in the island's division and the thousands of casualties were not in America's interest. But the fact that the southeastern

⁵⁹ Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Kissinger. (May 2007).

flank of NATO maintained peace and that Greece and Turkey after the crisis remained aligned and committed to Western mandates despite Eastern influences was a credit to American foreign policy.

The American involvement began early in 1950 when the United States, as a UN member, rejected the inclusion of the Cypriot issue in the UN⁶⁰ agenda. The United States intervened more decisively, though still keeping a low profile, when President Johnson condemned Turkey's ambition to invade Cyprus in 1967.⁶¹ From that time on, due to the eruption of violence on the island, the United States interference occurred via two important U.S. entities, the CIA and the later secretary of state, Henry Kissinger.

The Greek Cypriot community ascribes criminal responsibility to both, with the secretary of state at the head, because it is difficult to charge an organization of individuals whose work, however, is faceless. In two books, *Years of Upheaval* and *Years of Renewal*, Kissinger dedicates considerable space to the Cyprus conflict. He explains not only his own manipulations and intentions but also the contemporary political situation inside the United States and the precarious balance that existed between Greece, Turkey, and the Soviet Union. In his descriptive and representative political analysis, he tries to separate the American role⁶² from the evolution of events, forgoing and excusing his own embroilment. He places responsibility on the ethnic rivalry between Greece and Turkey and on individuals such as President Makarios and the Greek Colonels. Basically, Kissinger considers small nations "troublemakers"⁶³ and categorizes the Cypriot conflict as an "ethnic conflict" similar to that of Bosnia. He blames Archbishop Makarios⁶⁴ for

⁶⁰ "The United States was clearly concerned to avoid any implications of forestalling a Cypriot appeal to the United Nations." Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, *Cyprus: International Law and the Prospects for Settlement* (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1991), 13.

⁶¹ Letter from President Johnson to President Inonu. (Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict, and International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union* [New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.], 158. The message from the secretary of state confirms the American opposition to the Turkish aims.

⁶² Henry Kissinger, "Mythology of the U.S. involvement in Cyprus," *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 216.

⁶³ John L. Scherer, *Blocking the Sun* (University of Minnesota, 1997), 38.

⁶⁴ "Makarios is too big for so small an island" (Kissinger, in Joseph, *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict, and International Politics*, 74).

the destabilization of the island's regime because of his initiative in editing amendments to the constitution and his Soviet orientation. This orientation, Kissinger claims, and the acquisition of Soviet guns and missiles, provoked the Greek coup's anticommunism feelings⁶⁵ and its efforts to get rid of him. Makarios's decisive actions and enticing initiatives, in Kissinger's eyes, did not befit a newborn state's leader with a religious attribute. New and small states should naturally rely for their survival on stronger states and should stay committed and faithful to their protectors. Contrarily, Archbishop Makarios opened fronts against Greece, Turkey, Britain, the United States, and the domestic *enosis* strugglers of EOKA B, *while at the same time asking for Soviet and Arabic support.*

Kissinger characterized the American position during the crisis as neutral and docile, and made excuses for the American political system which does not give absolute control to any one of its three branches⁶⁶ and, consequently, to him as a U.S. representative. Additionally, according to Kissinger, the presidential transition had paralyzed the decision-making mechanisms⁶⁷ of U.S. foreign policy at a critical time, providing an excellent opportunity for the Turkish leaders to exploit their extremist ambitions. But even more than the American inability to intervene in or deter events, Kissinger holds the Greek faction responsible for the tragedy. To him, this included not only the dictators, but also Karamanlis's political government. Kissinger claims that Makarios's Soviet-missile acquisitions impelled the Greek Colonels to react against him and created the conditions for the first Turkish invasion. Karamanlis's immature and prejudiced manipulations against the United States' initiatives⁶⁸ also prompted the second invasion. Thereafter, trying again to absolve his own role of blame, Kissinger admits that President Ford's concessions to Turkey⁶⁹ and his attempt to blandish the Greek side after the invasion made him unwelcome to the Greek leaders.

⁶⁵ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 202.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 233.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 231.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 234.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 233.

Though Kissinger's argument does not explain all the folds of history surrounding the events in Cyprus, it is of considerable importance because of his central position. The points of his argument also reflect his intention to convince his readers that neither he nor the framers of American foreign policy had had any previous experience with ethnic conflicts.⁷⁰ But while he repeatedly ascribes the cause of the invasion to *ethnic* conflict and claims his own involvement was negligible, he does not explain why he kept his movements secret from the other involved officials and partners. He does this even though he had complete information about the events and even so did not send a deterring message as his predecessor had.⁷¹ Kissinger's interests and actions are at least questionable. For we recall that he was upset with the Europeans' lack of support for U.S. efforts to aid Israel during the Yom Kippur⁷² war, in which Israel's security was challenged, and how this was influenced by Cyprus's political and military situation. Moreover, Kissinger admits that Turkey's geopolitical location in relation to the Soviet Union's and Middle East borders was more important to U.S. interests⁷³ than the geopolitical location of Greece. This explains Kissinger's mild reaction to the Turkish plans and his inaction while those were completed and secured.

The CIA's role in the crisis is evident in the support it gave the established dictators in Greece in 1967 and in the major role the organization played during the Turkish invasion in 1974.⁷⁴ The idea of supporting a pro U.S. dictatorship in Greece was initiated as early as the 1960s, when the Papandreu government came into conflict with the CIA and the U.S. Information Agency on Special Matters, and his son Andreas tried to bring the Greek Central intelligence Agency (KYP) under his control.⁷⁵ The contrariness between Papandreu and the United States continued after the former's

⁷⁰ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 224.

⁷¹ See messages from the American embassy in Ankara and the National Security Council to the secretary of state a few days before the invasion. Compare with message from the secretary of state deterring invading ambitions in 1967. The documents are reproduced at the end of this thesis.

⁷² Wallace J. Thies, *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 140.

⁷³ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 225.

⁷⁴ O'Malley and Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy*, 179.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 234.

rejection of the Acheson Plan, which expressed the official American position on the problem. According to the Plan, the United States' position was aligned with Turkish ambitions and directed at the partition of the island.⁷⁶ Consequently, the possibilities of a left-wing coup, organized and directed by Andreas Papandreou's secret group, Aspida, or The Shield, and the total dominance of Georgios Papandreou's Center Union in the upcoming elections,⁷⁷ would create an exigent change in the official attitude toward strategic American interests. This change called for a right-wing military coup by accredited, ambitious, and powerful officers with key positions in the army, such as some colonels of the KYP who were closely connected to the CIA.

We should point out, however, that none of these conspiracy theories have ever been substantiated by a "smoking gun" in the declassified archival record. But many testimonies, studies, and reports do agree and verify that the U.S. involvement in Cyprus was not only determinative but also "distributed" throughout all the bodies of command of the American government. By inference, having always in mind that U.S. actions were aimed only at satisfying American interests in the region, the United States influenced events, determined their unfolding, and "allowed" the Turkish invasion to occur. And it did this for the following reasons.

At the time Greece and Turkey were simultaneously accepted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States was aspiring to gain greater influence in the eastern Mediterranean and, by extension, direct access to both its enemy, the Soviet Union, and the Middle East. However, the ethnic hostility between Greece and Turkey undermined their role as a go-between⁷⁸ in regard to American interests. So when the time came for the United States to resolve decisively the crisis in Cyprus, the risk of losing either Greece or Turkey or of endangering NATO's credibility and integrity, and

⁷⁶ O'Malley and Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy*, 236.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 237–8. It is very important here to note that O' Malley characterizes the years of G. Papandreou's governance in Greece as the "most free years since the civil war of '46–'49, which was a reason of distrust in the American eyes."

⁷⁸ Joseph, *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict, and International Politics*, 69.

thus, its survival, kept the United States at a safe distance. Thus, the U.S. involvement was limited to only indirect, “off the record” measures that nourished and abetted conspiracy scenarios and theories.

In January 1964, another incident deterred America’s “official” involvement: President Makarios’s rejection of a NATO plan⁷⁹ that provided for the deployment of 10,000 security troops on the island and for Western mediation for resolution. Its rejection compelled the United States to search for a different means to keep Cyprus under *U.S.* control.

On 11 May 1974, an American jet landed in Cyprus to pick up secret service equipment that was of vital importance from an intelligence station,⁸⁰ using specially trained units. On 10 August, three days before the second invasion, while all the national leaders from Greece and Turkey were in Geneva, a Turkish major who was carrying the plans for the invasion was captured by Greek-Cypriot forces.⁸¹ Both these incidents show that everyone –the United States, Great Britain, Greece, and Cyprus– knew about the Turkish invasion. No one tried to stop it because, *as far as it concerns the United States, Turkey had realized its ability* to blackmail⁸² the United States by threatening to achieve the same goals using the Soviet Union instead of the United States.

Turkish Prime Minister Bullet Ecevit, despite having been Kissinger’s student⁸³ during a Harvard seminar, was a left-wing ideologist. He exploited to the fullest degree the United States’ attempt to keep him aligned with NATO instead of with the Soviets, who were ready to be involved in the crisis. In other words, Ecevit managed to transform Turkey into the “big fish”⁸⁴ in the game, that both superpowers were being challenged to obtain.

⁷⁹ Joseph, *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict, and International Politics*, 62.

⁸⁰ O’Malley and Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy*, 234.

⁸¹ Ibid., 208.

⁸² Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 65.

⁸³ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 217.

⁸⁴ Joseph, *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict, and International Politics*, 74.

Around 1964, during the Papandreu regime, Cyprus had more than 10,000 Greek troops,⁸⁵ a very promising number in terms of the island's security against invasion. After the establishment of a Greek dictatorship in 1967, in response to U.S. requests the Greek troops returned to Greece. This provided an opportunity for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus issue within NATO mandates and the Acheson Plan. However, according to contemporary writers and most of the Greek and Greek Cypriot people, this opened the door to Turkish invasion. But since the Turks' first opportunity to invade in 1967 was deterred by President Johnson, the latter accusation seems exaggerated. Any potential political confrontation was directed mainly against the Papandreu regime and any left-wing power in Cyprus, not against the Cyprus defense force.

After 1967, the military regime in Greece had significant U.S. political support and was also supplied with a great number of arms by the United States.⁸⁶ However, the Nixon government, under pressure exerted by public opinion and the European Council, slightly altered the U.S. policy and stopped supporting the Greek colonels, at least publicly. This shift in policy by the U.S. government may be what prompted the colonels to cooperate with the American secret service and to trust them even more, at the same time, taking a risky initiative in Cyprus.

The imposition of an embargo on U.S. military supplies to Turkey was not really a reaction against the Turkish invasion, but the result of a mobilized Greek lobby⁸⁷ in America that was trying to shift U.S. foreign policy toward Greek interests. This had little impact on the benefits that Turkey gained from invading Cyprus, however. Nonetheless, since the invasion the United States has maintained a solid position in regard to missing persons⁸⁸ and the remaining Turkish troops in the captured northern part of the island. This is because of Turkey's increasing value in the evolving situation between Israel and Iraq in the Middle East since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the withdrawal of

⁸⁵ Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece, and Turkey*, 46.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 52; R. Clogg and G. Yannopoulos, *Greece under Military Rule* (New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1972), 244.

⁸⁷ Joseph, *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict, and International Politics*, 75.

⁸⁸ Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 61–63.

Turkish troops without agreement on a security solution would cause agitation and revenge operations instead of the current peace, even though it is maintained with arms.

The United States has not provided any assistance or actual mediation toward solving the Cyprus problem because it has always benefited from maintaining Greece and Turkey in a safe and peaceful rivalry. By maintaining that instability, the United States can continue to exert its influence in the area and keep the levels of military purchases by both antagonists very high.⁸⁹

Another aspect that shows America's compliance in the Turkish invasion and subsequent demands has to do with Turkey's eastern borders. Cyprus's interests were sacrificed by the United States in return for the national interests that Turkey relinquished in the Middle East.⁹⁰ For example, Turkey's withdrawal from its territorial claims against the Lebanese and Iraqi oil resources was confirmed by its participation in the British-dominated Baghdad Pact of February 1955, which was, however, an issue of internal criticism. That shared "identity of Turkish interests"⁹¹ with the involvement of the United States in Middle East issues did not allow much hope for a greater claim, unless those could be exchanged for equal Turkish claims in a different location, such as in Cyprus.

One final reason that the United States "allowed" the Turkish invasion is our personal assessment derived from our research. The United States "allowed" the Turkish invasion because the evolution of events eased the gradual creation of the "new Europe" model that the United States had long had in mind. We noted in our historical review that the Turkish troops were not content simply to defeat the Greeks and occupy northern Cyprus. They continued south to eliminate the British bases. We also saw that Cyprus was of key importance to Great Britain's continued dominance in the Middle East and to the Baghdad Pact. Britain's loss of the bases fit with the American concept of a new, integrated, powerful, and unified Europe with its borders identified geographically

⁸⁹ Scherer, *Blocking the Sun*, 88–90. It is worth mentioning that Turkey and Greece are the second and third biggest purchasers, respectively, of American arms.

⁹⁰ Couloumbis. *The United States, Greece, and Turkey*, 34.

⁹¹ Tassos Chatzianastasiou, *Cyprus and Change-over: The Complex of Defeat* (Alternative Publishing, 2004), 18.

throughout. These aspirations provided for a new Europe allied with the United States, with coinciding and equivalent members and European orientations that would assert their influence on out-of-area targets only through NATO mandates. The new Europe would consist of effete individual members, but would create a strong totality and be a strong, conscripted, and controllable ally.

3. The Soviet Union

For most historians who have studied the Cyprus crisis, the Soviet Union was merely a beholder of events and contributed precious little to their evolution. This ratiocination seems correct to those who consider the Cypriot crisis an extension of long-standing Greco-Turkish conflicts and therefore an intra-NATO dispute. But even if the Cyprus crisis is considered an internal NATO problem, it would be unwise to deny that it also provided a good opportunity for the Soviet Union to intervene and gain from the situation, especially as the field of interest was so close to its borders. Although few studies are dedicated to the Soviet contribution, we will briefly describe some of the more obscure folds of the pertinent international diplomacy.



Figure 5. The General Secretary of the Soviet Party in 1974: Leonid Brezhnev.⁹²

During the early post-WWII years, the Soviet Union tried to gain access to the warm Mediterranean waters. But the peaceful settlement between Churchill and Stalin⁹³ for the distribution of the Balkan countries, and the Soviet Union's unsuccessful attempt

⁹² Google,
http://images.google.com/images?q=pictures+of+Breshnev&ndsp=18&svnum=10&hl=en&rlz=1T4DMUS_enUS222US223&start=18&sa=N. (May 2007).

⁹³ Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 6.

to establish communism by civil war in Greece and Turkey in the following years, excluded any legal Soviet right to that access unless it could find an appropriate “ally.” The ally that emerged was Cyprus, which was as legal as could be desired. Not only did the local communist party, AKEL, follow a normal democratic process, it was also the most popular party on the island. In addition, Cyprus’s president and religious leader was orientated to the Soviets through old religious ties to Russia.⁹⁴ Makarios’s nonalignment with Western mandates, rejection of the NATO peace plan, and decision to follow a UN path sounded the alarm for U.S. and British interests in the region. Blocking the Soviets’ legal involvement via the UN, however, impelled Moscow to follow the same backstage method to support the left-wing regime of Cyprus.

Cyprus gave the Soviets an opportunity not only to endanger the eastern flank of NATO and its future aspirations in the Middle East, but also to cause instability within NATO by transferring the Greco-Turkish dispute to the alliance. Moreover, contrary to the Cuban crisis of 1962, in which the Soviet Union had backed away from its position due to American decisiveness, the crisis in Cyprus was so close to the Soviet borders that it could not go unattended unless the Soviets gained an equivalent benefit.

So, from the very first moment of the crisis, the Soviet Union supported Makarios’s government, supplying the island with large quantities of arms, including heavy artillery, tanks, torpedo boats, and anti-aircraft missiles.⁹⁵ The Soviets declared that this action was part of the legal and matter-of-course right of the Cypriots to defend their freedom. The assistance was extended politically in an open hearing in 1964 that threatened the Turks with a “boomerang effect” if they should invade. At the same time, Khrushchev himself sent a message to Washington that the Soviet Union “cannot and will not remain indifferent to the threat of an armed conflict near her southern borders.”⁹⁶

⁹⁴ In the same way the revolutionary war for independence of 1821 against the Turks was blessed by the Orthodox Church and supported by the Tsarist and also Orthodox Russia.

⁹⁵ Joseph, *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict, and International Politics*, 67.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

In a letter to President Johnson, Khrushchev condemned the Americans for “aiming at actual occupation by NATO forces of the Republic of Cyprus which adheres to a policy of nonalignment with military blocs.”⁹⁷

However, in 1974, the Soviet attitude toward Turkish ambitions changed dramatically in favor of them, an effect that can be explained by the Soviet-Turkish rapprochement. The Turks, disappointed by an American “lack of sensitivity” in fulfilling their goals in the Cypriot crisis, shifted their interest toward the Soviet faction. The Soviets established close political and economic bonds with the Turks, which culminated in a \$3.8 billion agreement in 1979. Their loss of legal access to the island after Makarios’s dethroning by a military coup reduced their objections to the invasion. And, in effect, the Soviets changed sides, deserting Cyprus and all those who relied on Soviet help alone to fight against the Turkish imperialistic aggression.

Those dependent on the Soviets included: the Greek dictators and their fatal plans for *enosis*; the terrorists of EOKA B working for the same plan; the Americans’ reluctant and hesitant counterbalancing of its own interests in the area; and the British inability to protect its own interests and put out the fire it had started on the island. This change of the balance of power was the actual, absolute reason for the drama in Cyprus. The Soviet Union was responsible. This did not indicate any specific antipathy by the Soviets against other nations, of course. It was just how diplomacy works and a manifestation of the real, impermanent, and flexible nature of international relations that are based on individual interests of any kind. Indeed, in 1922 and 1955 in Turkey, a similar scenario with almost the same leading actors resulted in thousands of native residents losing their homes and property.

B. THE TWO CYPRIOT MOTHERLANDS: GREECE AND TURKEY

1. Greece

Most Greeks, even today, ignore or pass along the contribution of the Greek side at the events of the summer of 1974 due to fact that the actions of the Greek coup did not

⁹⁷ Joseph, *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict, and International Politics*, 63.

represent the Greek people and were not authorized by any legal government. However the established coup in Cyprus and the effort to annex the island through violence by the dictators in Greece gave the excuse to the Turks to invade.



Figure 6. The “Colonels”: Leaders of the Dictatorship in Greece from '67-'74.⁹⁸

The drama of Cyprus which meant the loss of another old country along with many thousands of compatriots caused great anger and pain in the Greek community. The people insisted that charges be brought and that those who were guilty of the crime should be convicted. But both the political and the military leaders rejected the idea of declaring war against Turkey, which would have appeased the passions of the crowds. The need for someone to assume responsibility became crucial. Representatives of the new democracy found it easy to blame the dictatorship and American intervention, as if the political situation in Greece before the first invasion and during the second was entirely innocent and uninvolved. Indeed, from the Greek perspective, both the political and the military factions had a significant role in the Cyprus crisis and were responsible for the evolution of events that led to the conflict.

After the civil war of 1946–49, democracy in Greece struggled to survive and to defeat the ultra-right factions that intended to seize power by force of arms but found themselves isolated after their victory against the communists. At the same time, many imprisoned leftist ideologues, branded with the sign of communism, were used to justify the rightist influences inside the government. Thus, the postwar Greek political scene consisted of an insecure democracy dependent on a weak government that consisted

⁹⁸ Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_military_junta_of_1967-1974. (May 2007).

mainly of shortsighted political alliances marked by a micropartisan tendentiousness. The political regime cultivated a client relationship between the parties and the voters, which meant that the government's survival depended on political manipulation and decision-making that had a low political cost.




Figure 7. The first Greek Prime Minister after the dictatorship: Konst. Karamanlis.⁹⁹

But decisions that plunge a country into war are usually politically risky decisions that, in addition to decisive leaders, require a powerful regime, which most of the pre-coup governments did not have. On the other hand, a temporary, beleaguered government can hardly deal with serious foreign policy issues, especially when there is no constant official political will or plan, as was the case in postwar Greece. Indeed, the problematic governance of the country during the 1960s worried the people very much. And this, in turn, created even more opportunities for nonpolitical factions to intervene, such as by a coup by the king.¹⁰⁰ It is no exaggeration to say that many welcomed a temporary intervention by either the king or the army, which was closely connected with the king, in order to obtain the desired political stability. However, aside from the problems that the unstable democratic regime caused within Greek politics, opening the door to a coup, the previous government and leaders had also made substantial mistakes that had a negative impact on the Cypriot crisis.

⁹⁹ Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constantine_Karamanlis. (May 2007).

¹⁰⁰ Laurence Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy* (New York: NY Times Books, 1977), 41.

To Greece's post-WWII governments, Cyprus was the reward Greece deserved in return for its contribution to the war, as had been promised by the British. Control of Cyprus was a privilege, they claimed, that derived from the island's long Greek history, its predominantly Greek civilization, and its right to determine its own future according to Cyprus's majority law. Cyprus was also the only remaining stronghold of a glorious empire that had extended far to the East and that, after five thousands years, had been violently uprooted by the same conqueror that had conquered Greece itself, the Ottomans. Cyprus represented the last hope for integration – without its expulsion from the land of its ancestors – of the only massive Greek population that remained outside of Greece itself.

From the perspective of the pre-coup governments, Cyprus's future was connected with Greece's deep, emotional national sensitivities. But, in this regard, under pressure from ultra-right elements situated at high levels in the administration and army, they were constrained by a single, shortsighted strategy. One of its goals was the *enosis* of Cyprus with Greece. This was handled through the UN, but it became transformed after 1960 into a different goal, the independence of Cyprus while maintaining the dominant rights of the Greek majority. Both goals inequitably favored the Greek community and disregarded the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community. Both goals reflected the prejudiced Greek attitude toward both Cyprus and other international-relations issues. The goals evidence the Greeks' immature and cursory evaluation of the contemporary balance between the two island communities and their own inability to estimate and process the difficulties of that distinctly dual society. To Greece, Cyprus represented the prize in the face of Greco-Turkish antagonism, as if *enosis* was a solution also for the Turkish Cypriots. This display of indifference by the Greek government to the problems of the Turkish community regenerated their fear of rejection and insecurity. Their fear increased when large numbers of Greek officers were stationed on the island to deter a Turkish threat and when EOKA B terrorists used the British-Turkish military operations as an excuse to turn against innocent civilians.

While the pre-coup government's treatment of Cyprus was more emotional than logical and was very nearsighted, the decisions of the first democratic government after

the coup validated Greece's intention to sacrifice Cyprus in order to advance its own interests. In a December 1974 council meeting,¹⁰¹ the Greek leaders tried unsuccessfully to convince their Greek-Cypriot counterparts that Greece had valid reasons for not protecting Cyprus either before or during the invasion. After analyzing these records, we concluded that the sacrifice of Cyprus was viewed by the pro-dictatorship forces as a means to cause the collapse of the Greek dictatorship and establish democracy in Greece.¹⁰² The Greek population would be convinced that the loss of Cyprus was due to the dictators and that the country should immediately return to a democratic rule.

The cost of losing the northern part of Cyprus was also attributed to the dictators, so that Greece would not be forced to go to war with Turkey. War would have transferred the colonels' mistakes to the new democratic administration, which would then have been blamed for any of the war's disastrous consequences. Thus, for clearly political reasons, during the second invasion the Greek democratic regime denied protection to Cyprus. This cost the island great losses, including thousands of injured and uprooted civilians. However, the denial of protection should not be connected to the spirit of revenge and ambition that the rightists have capitalized on since the dramatic events in Cyprus. The protection we refer to here was simply a refusal to be involved in the thwarting of the Turkish plans.

In any case, any action that maintains peace is only a temporary solution until a formal peace agreement is signed. The way the Greek governments both before and after the coup dealt with the Cyprus problem illustrates the importance of the political costs in post-WWII Greece: distancing itself from the problem only contributed to it and its evolution. However, the trigger of the gun, so to speak, was not pulled by the inattentive governments, but by the Colonels responsible for the coup. But before we place the entire blame on the coup, we should also point out the responsibility of a large segment of the Greek population. Many people supported the dictatorship by their silence and by their

¹⁰¹ "The Other Attestation: Secret: The Minutes of 1December 1974"(Nicosia: Moli Publications, 1991).

¹⁰² It is remarkable that Prime Minister K. Karamanlis won the elections of November 1974 with 54 percent of the vote which was considered a tremendous percentage and verifies the idea of a strong democracy through strong government.

lack of resistance. Their support was largely due to the economic enhancements that the colonels offered, mostly to members of the middle class; to the conveniences they granted to shipowners and other economic colossi; and to the economic growth in the country during the first three years of their rule.¹⁰³

Many times in the past, military forces have intervened in Greece to seize control of the state. In most cases their intervention was brief, was beneficial to particular political parties, and was relinquished in favor of civil rule after their forces secured the stability of the state institutions. During the dictatorship of 1967, however, the colonels used the current confused political situation as an excuse to condemn all the political parties for misleading the people. Using rhetoric that had proved inspiring in previous revolutionary struggles, the military forces established their dictatorship on a loyal base. As we have seen, the colonels were the executors of Cyprus's peace, security, and integrity,, and thus, were as guilty as the Turks for the many thousands of dead, injured, and expelled. Indeed, they were more guilty, because they did not have the excuse of needing to protect a part of the country's population, the Turkish Cypriots, as the Turks did. They were also more guilty because it was their interference that provoked the Turks, thereby providing them an excuse for invading.

It is the colonels who having trusted foreign secret services organized and ordered the struggle against the Cypriot president, Makarios. It is they who directed the declared civil war against compatriots, killing thousands of them and imprisoning many more. It is they who left Cyprus unprotected against foreign territorial aspirations, causing thousands of deaths, changing the island's homogeneity, and damaging by their actions the Greek national image. Those actions comprised an atrocious display of violence against the legal government of Cyprus; against a political regime that was a response to both domestic demands and an international agreement; against Makarios as an individual, since they aimed at killing him regardless of his religious attribute and the

¹⁰³ Richard Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece* (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 195–196.

inspiration he evoked because of it; against innocent Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot civilians of all ages; and against the history, traditions, and future of an island that thirty-two years later still cannot find peace.

The colonels' chief goal of course was to unite Cyprus with Greece, regardless of the consequences for the Turkish Cypriots' future. The colonels' background as rightists caused them to go against their own nationalist feelings and attribute their actions to an ethnic dimension that is directly opposite to what we have concluded so far was the case in the Cyprus crisis. We studied their declarations,¹⁰⁴ tactics, maneuvers, and decisions, having always in mind that they had created civil war in Cyprus and that they raised their weapons against the Greeks Cypriots in much the same way that they had changed their weapons against the Greek students a few months earlier in Greece. As a result, we concluded that, in general, their motives were neither ethnically inspired nor ethnically oriented.

The colonels' actions were the result of their own personal ambitions and their great confidence in their movement. They used the ideology and slogans that the dictator Ioannis Metaxas had used during his dictatorship (1936–1941), glorifying him like a god because of his successful decision to array the country against Italy in WWII. By imitating Metaxas's dictatorship, they intended to validate their ambitions and prove that they could do what the government in Greece had not been able to do – unite Cyprus with Greece. It was as though they hoped to inscribe their names in Greek history in letters of gold. And, indeed, if they had managed to unite Cyprus with Greece, their names would now rank equal to those of Kolokotronis, Venizelos, and Metaxas, who gave Greece its current borders. And no one would now talk about the deaths, but only about the sacrifices. But historians are often selective in their treatment of those who order the killing of millions. While some are called "beasts," like Hitler, others are called "reformers," like Bonaparte and Ataturk.

¹⁰⁴ Clogg and Yannopoulos, *Greece under Military Rule*, 228–245; Clogg, *Short History of Modern Greece*, 166–199; Stern, *The Wrong Horse*, 77–125.

2. Turkey

The Turkish invasion was the most direct foreign intervention and the culmination of the crisis on the island of Cyprus. The Turkish Army was the only official national army involved, and it changed dramatically the political makeup and the demographic distribution of the island. While the invasion improved Turkey's contemporary negotiating power, it prevented a political resolution of the crisis for many decades. This was the case despite Turkish Minister Ecevit's declaration in 1974 that the Cypriot problem was resolved.¹⁰⁵ At the same time, it committed the Turkish Cypriot population in the north to isolation from the rest of the island.

What is most important for this study, however, is our examination of the nature of the Turkish intervention. Was it a result of ethnic ambitions or, as in previous cases, a result of the imposition of domestic and international interests? While the Greco-Turkish ethnic rivalry in Cyprus is well known, we are attempting here to demonstrate that the Turkish intervention and invasion were not ethnically motivated, but were the result of other motivations. To demonstrate this, we begin with a brief outline of the political, social, and economic features of the Turkish state both before and at the time of the invasion.

3. The Turkish State

The political situation in post-WWII Turkey was similar to that of Greece. Civil war and military coups threatened the survival of both unstable democracies. But in Turkey the military faction remained powerful and influential, even during democratic periods and the adjustments they brought to the country's foreign policy. The military maintained its power by moving into sensitive positions in the civil services, schools, and mass media. It is remarkable that the interventions of the army in 1960–61, 1971–73, and 1980–83 were justified as constitutional¹⁰⁶ and necessary for the security of the country's

¹⁰⁵ Tozun Bahcheli, "The Cypriot Challenge for Turkey: The Conquests of 1974 to be Maintained," in *Current Turkey* (Athens: Papazisis Publishings, 2002), 603.

¹⁰⁶ Metin Heper, "Turkey: The Political System Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow," in *Current Turkey* (Athens: Papazisis Publishings, 2002), 37.

democratic orientation. In contrast, the inability of the unstable political governments of 1961, 1964, 1965, and 1969 to secure democratic mandates after being accused of abuses and corruption¹⁰⁷ provided an opportunity for the interference of the army.

Turkish servicemen considered themselves inheritors and depositories of the Kemalic principles and defenders of a Westernization process through the secularism of the state. The role of “the state’s owner”¹⁰⁸ that the army in Turkey demanded was augmented by an expressed conception of the national security ideology. By using psychology to keep the country convinced of the existence of danger from external and internal enemies, the army could act undeterred by the political bodies of the government.¹⁰⁹ However, the army used a method that emboldened the nationalistic feelings of the people, contrary to its Western philosophy and the secular state it preserved. Thus, we assume that the army exerted pressure on the Turkish government in order to impose a military solution on Cyprus.



Figure 8. The Turkish Prime Minister in 1974: Bülent Ecevit.¹¹⁰

Going deeper into the structure of the Turkish state and looking at its foundations, however, we find a mixture of serious political and social influences that gives the impression of a country acting under compulsion. That impression, though, is not correct.

¹⁰⁷ Thanos Veremis, *The History of Greco-Turkish Relations 1453–2003* (Athens: I. Sideris Publishing, 2003), 131.

¹⁰⁸ Ihsan D. Dagi, “Human Rights and Democratization: The Turkish Foreign Policy in European Margin,” in *Current Turkey*, 83–84.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Nouvelles d’Arménie Magazine, www.armenews.com, <http://www.armenews.com/IMG/arton26355.jpg>. (May 2007).

By the time Kemal Ataturk seized power and drew on the national ethnic conscience to re-create the fragmented Islamic country, Turkey intended to begin a process of integration and renewal, using ethnic sensitivity as its most effectual weapon. This would secure and limit the newborn state because it would work better with the people.

The ethnic cleansing of the Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, and Franks between 1890 and 1922 and in 1955 demonstrated the success of the Turkish state in becoming more ethnically uniform. Waves of nationalist Panturkism and Panturanism¹¹¹ raged significantly within Turkish society, recruiting members even among the elite and influencing politics in Turkey many times. The spearhead of these ideologies took the form of an ethnic extremist group known as the “Grey-wolves,”¹¹² which was responsible for creating and arming a twin terrorist organization of Turkish expansionism in Cyprus, called the Turkish Cypriot Resistance Organization, or TMT.

The purpose of the Cyprus TMT from beginning to end was terrorism. Having absolute backing from the Turkish government and the British secret service,¹¹³ the resistance organization initially conscripted its members in Cyprus. However, the basic goals of the group were to arouse the ethnic passions of the Turkish-Cypriot population against the Greek Cypriots and gather stray Turkish Cypriots into enclaves. The latter was done in order to more easily control and, more important, separate them, in preparation for the eventual partitioning of the island.

Using provocation, TMT members managed to turn the Turkish Cypriots against the constitutional government and the EOKA B against the Turkish Cypriots. They used extreme violence against the Turkish Cypriots who refused to conform to their orders or who betrayed them. In only a few days, they forced more than 60 percent of the Turkish-Cypriot population to leave their homes and jobs and gather into enclaves.¹¹⁴ Just like the

¹¹¹ These are the two most extreme forms of Turkish nationalism. The height of Panturanism was revealed in the Turkish state’s absorption of Alexandretta, the Syrian port with a Turkish minority the same size and characteristics of the Cypriot one that finally was named Iskenderun (Costas Yennaris, *From the East* [London and Bath: Elliot & Thompson, 1999]), 49–57.

¹¹² Yennaris, *From the East*, 50.

¹¹³ Ibid., 83–127.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 89, 153.

EOKA B, the TMT turned against their Turkish compatriots, destroying their balanced life and putting them in danger from both the Greeks and the Turks and from both individual and group wildness. The ethnic division that Turkey relied on was transformed into terrorism against the Turkish-Cypriot community in an effort to justify Turkey's further political interference and finally its military intervention.

Hence, nationalism for the Turks worked differently than the narrow interpretation of it that the Greeks ascribed to them. Nationalism was the most important constituent of Turkey's drive to establish a new state. The resulting ethnic tension was not directed against any particular nation, but toward all those that they viewed as obstacles to Turkey's safety or ambitions. The strategy worked, however, more because of internal consumption reasons than external influences. Thus, Turkey's foreign policy does not follow the ethnically prejudiced logic that the Greeks assumed it did because of Turkey's aggressive attitude. Turkey's policies followed a well-prepared, methodical, and continuous tactic, based on the consideration that the country's survivability relied on its ability to expand, secure the coherence of the state, and mollify the impetuosity caused by the internal ethnic tensions. Cyprus was a victim of Turkey's "political" extremism and its fear of losing forever the Turkish population on the island. They believed that that development would result in corruption of the central government under pressure from an uncontrollable and angry populace.

In addition to being poorer and less educated than the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots had to compete with a larger, more highly organized population that could easily absorb and integrate them. We can compare the case of Cyprus with the great expulsion of Greeks in 1922 from Asia Minor, especially Smyrna, where they had prospered and continuously increased their power.¹¹⁵ Whether or not Cyprus was annexed by Greece, Turkey's reaction is understandable. For Turkey with no constitution, an independent and self-determinant Cyprus would be inconvenient, because it would challenge the elites' efforts to portray the Turks as facing severe security threats.

¹¹⁵ Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece*, 78.

Thus, to maintain control in the region, Turkey wanted to partition the population and by extension the entire island. Its leaders hoped that the ethnic dimension that Turkey infused into the crisis would validate its actions in the eyes of the Turkish people, would legitimize its intervention to the international community, and would maintain its vested rights after the invasion. In other words, Turkey ascribed an ethnic character to the crisis and thereby managed to separate the two communities, obliging the international community to resolve the conflict and leading to the current status. However, as we already mentioned, Turkey's claim of success in respect to the ethnic dimension was clearly designed for internal consumption only. In contrast, what was evident on the island was the unprovoked terrorism deliberately conducted by the Turks against the Turkish Cypriots as an excuse for invasion. The warlike events of January 1996 between Greece and Turkey near the Imia Islands can also be described as necessary for internal consumption, to distract Turkish public opinion from the country's serious economic and social problems.¹¹⁶

Consequently, Turkey's foreign policy has often been viewed as the result of Realpolitik, as conducted by an ethnically structured central state. That Turkey successfully achieved all its goals in Cyprus by military means and got off scot-free is a measure of its mature and efficient manipulation of the international scene. That success was also a result of Turkey's ability to blackmail its Western allies and exploit its strategic geographical location to the utmost. The Turks used "indiscipline,"¹¹⁷ mostly against NATO and the United States, to demonstrate that Turkey had neither "ethnic"

¹¹⁶ Tansu Tsiller conducted Greece and Turkey to the doors of war to enhance her position as prime minister (Bahcheli, *Current Turkey*), 614.

¹¹⁷ In 1967, Turkey denied to the United States use of its bases for the bombing of Arab countries, in 1973 during the Yom Kippur war refused overflight to U.S. planes to support Israel, in 1976, '79, and '83 allowed overflights of Soviet planes despite NATO objections, in 1979 refused to allow the U.S. to dispatch Marines and helicopters from the American base in Incirlik to evacuate Americans from Iran, in 1989 denied permission to Americans to inspect its Soviet Mig-29s, in 1989 rejected American demands to install surveillance antennas on Turkish territory, in 1991 blocked delivery of mine-clearing equipment in Iraq, that same year denied America a "permanent" presence on the base of Incirlik and several years later to the British and French, in 1996 signed a 22-year agreement with Iran for the purchase of a million cubic feet of natural gas, the same year made the same agreement with Iraq, in 1996 and 2003 refused America use of its bases for attacks against Iraq. During the Cold War, Turkey received unlimited support from the Soviet Union after an economic agreement; Turkey threatened to veto former Communist nations' entrance into NATO unless Turkey was accepted into the EU, etc. (Scherer, *Blocking the Sun*, 89–91).

friends nor “ethnic” rivals. It had merely adjusted its international relations according to its own interests regardless of their national derivation or any related alliance. That’s exactly what it claimed to have done in Cyprus.

In addition to the political influences, the crisis in Cyprus had an economic aspect. Before the invasion, the northern part of Cyprus occupied by the Turkish army, though only 37 percent of the island, produced 70 percent of Cyprus’s wealth.¹¹⁸ That is why, despite the fact that less than 40 percent of Turkish Cypriots lived in the northern portion, Turkey chose that part to relocate them. As a result, about 40,000 Turkish Cypriots were forced to abandon their property and lives in the south and settle in the north.

By inference, Turkey’s interest in Cyprus, which had served as a catalyst for the survival of the state’s ethnic mandates, was transformed into terrorism against both Cypriot communities, resulting in their partition and displacement. The Turkish military invasion was executed only to secure the advantage that they already had of separating the populations, as if this was the result of an ethnic confrontation that could be deterred in the future by maintaining that separatism.

C. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AND CIVIL WARS

1. Cyprus

So far we have investigated all but one of the countries that participated in the evolution of the Cyprus crisis, in an attempt to ascertain the motives that affected their decisions and how their interests would benefit from a resolution of the crisis. In that pursuit, we have investigated all the countries but one, Cyprus itself. We concluded that none of the countries acted in favor of the Cypriot people, and none supported or worked to promote the newly created democratic state. To the contrary, all of them harmed the people, their future prospects, and the security of Cyprus. In fact, all of the countries contributed dramatically to the conflict and demonstrated that, as far as they were

¹¹⁸ Cypriot President Clerides during the famous council of 1974 in Greece between Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders, *The Other Attestation: Secret: The Minutes of the Council of 1974* (Nicosia: Moli Publishing, 1991), 13. Analytically, the occupied land used represented 46% of agricultural production, 100% of tobacco production, 47% of animal farming, 26% of industrial production, 33% of employment, 65% of tourist industry, and 87% of tourist installations under construction (Yennaris, *From the East*, 237).

concerned, the Cypriot conflict was not an ethnic conflict. Even Greece and Turkey, whose ethnic rivalry is well recognized in international studies, despite being ethnically and emotionally tied to Cyprus, used an atrocious amount of military violence and terror. And they did so with little regard for the Cypriots who shared their ethnic identities but in a clear effort to benefit politically. We now turn to the ongoing effort to relieve the conflict in Cyprus of its ethnic dimension. This requires, first, examining Cyprus from the inside to distinguish between the communal, the individual, and the group influences.

a. Communal Influences

The unique ethnic sensitivities of the Cypriot biracial community were cited earlier. We did not discuss, however, the reaction of the two communities to “imported” influences or examine whether this was a result of their ethnic difference. Because much of the related literature was influenced by the fifteen-year escalation period that preceded the invasion, to understand Greco-Turkish relations in Cyprus it is important to study them in depth. Those mainly cursory studies almost always characterize Greece and Turkey as ethnic rivals. However, those were also the years that both the terrorist groups EOKA B and the TMT were recruiting and bombing at will, thereby creating a prime situation for the respective armies to intervene.

More important, those were the only years that the communities were detached and mistrustful. Looking back on history, we find that that it was largely peaceful, safe, and creative. The fact that during the Greek revolutionary war of 1821, the Greek Cypriots abandoned their weapons to the Turkish sultan¹¹⁹ shows that they realized the necessity of a peaceful symbiosis. Many writers both confirm and explain the peaceful coexistence between the Greeks and Turks as a natural result of the scattered and mixed nature of the population. In addition, their everyday lives were very similar – for example, both had to struggle to earn a living – which outweighed their racial and religious differences.¹²⁰ For many of the years under British rule, the union-based economy translated into a union-based community., and thus, both the Greek and the

¹¹⁹ Tassos Chatzianastasiou, *Cyprus and Change-over: The Complex of Defeat* (Alternative Publishing, 2004), 15.

¹²⁰ Yennaris, *From the East*, 33.

Turkish Cypriots had the same basic interests: better wages, better working conditions, and improved social benefits and medical care.¹²¹ As a result, many writers attest to the bonds that existed between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots at the time of the invasion. Aside from a few acts of revenge on both sides by imitators of the terrorist groups, most historians find no evidence of enmity among them. Some even describe departing families giving their housekeys to arriving refugees “for them to look after it.”¹²²

We found that another factor, the diverse ways the two communities perceived the national struggle for independence, does not necessarily invalidate the evidence of their peaceful coexistence. To the Greek Cypriots, it was a revolutionary war against the cruel and oppressive dominance of Great Britain, which was not directed against the Turkish Cypriot population. The bulk of Greek literature¹²³ on the subject applauds the revolutionary struggle and presents the EOKA fighters as heroes of the revolution. It shows how popular the struggle was in the Greek-Cypriot community and how brutally the young fighters were killed by the British, but nothing is said against the Turkish Cypriots. Being in the minority, they were not expected to block the revolution.

However, by the time the Turkish state became embroiled in the Greek revolution, the meaning of the term “minority” had changed. It had come to mean a “self-determination” movement. While this transformation did not change relations between the two communities, it did justify and provide an ideology that the two terrorist groups, EOKA B and TMT, could use to recruit and operate. Nonetheless, the groups found little support for their cruel ambitions, for fewer than 300¹²⁴ men joined from each community. In explaining the ethnic conflict, many writers identify the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots’ passion as a fierce determination by both communities to join Cyprus with their motherlands, Greece and Turkey. We find this argument reasonable, but it does not affect the analysis of the conflict presented here. As we have said, the ethnic

¹²¹ Yennaris, *From the East*, 45.

¹²² Ibid., 89, 153.

¹²³ The name of Grigoris Afxendiou, who found unkind death by the British in 1957, became a symbol of the struggle, and the cave he was burned in became the focal point of a folk pilgrimage (H. Venezis, “The Cave,” in *Argonautes* (Athens: Estia Publishing, 1960).

¹²⁴ *The Other Attestation*, 20.

dimension was a natural element that reflected both communities' inherent ethnic orientation. The Greek-Cypriot struggle for *enosis* with Greece was a reaction to their perception of a threat from Turkey's expansionism. If carried over into Cyprus, that would make the Greek Cypriots the "minority" and position them against fifty million Turks, instead of 120,000 Turkish Cypriots.¹²⁵ The Turkish-Cypriot struggle for *taksim* was also reasonable. It reflected their fear, first, of the UN stipulation of peace in the Greek struggle, which raised a serious possibility that the Turkish Cypriots would be assimilated. Second, they also feared the military aspect, specifically, an EOKA B coup that would expel or destroy them.

There is one interesting scientific study that uses a complex theoretical game – known as “the prisoner’s dilemma”¹²⁶ – based on psychological and sociological theories to analyze the Cyprus crisis. The study was published just three months before the Turkish invasion. It comes closer than most to a comprehensive explanation of the internal causes of the crisis. The author, Malvern Lumsden, considers the crisis as a dynamic changeable situation between two basic democratic principles of an ethnic minority group in an ethnic-type conflict: the principle of majority and the principle of autonomy. For the study, 185 student teachers from both Cypriot communities were asked about four possible results or changes in the conflict. The results are shown in the diagram below. The teachers were asked to prioritize their choices according to which change or result would made them “feel better.”

These choices were then processed via changing balancing coefficients of the conflict, such as the “possibility of war,” “time extension, “value of war,” and “superordinate goal.”

¹²⁵ Stern, *The Wrong Horse*, 80–91.

¹²⁶ Malvern Lumsden, “The Cyprus Conflict as a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 1973), 7.

		Turkish Cypriots	
		1. Modify position	2. Maintain position
Greek Cypriots	1. Modify position	peace	Taksim
	2. Maintain position	Enosis	war

Table 1. The Prisoners' Dilemma Table of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.¹²⁷

Each of these factors made possible valuable predictions which could offer good information to all those who would handle and conduct the crisis. For example, increasing the “possibility of war” would push the communities to further persist in their efforts for *enosis/taksim*; “extending the time of the crisis” would create a good opportunity to suppress the crisis in favor of their common interests, such as acceptance in the EU.

The study’s conclusions support our removal of the “ethnic-type” label from the characterization of the conflict in Cyprus. The “prisoner’s dilemma” experiment explains the increased tensions as a result of the misperceptions and mistrust of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots that arose after the Turkish-Cypriot population was gathered into enclaves. The experiment identifies the conflict itself as a symmetrical conflict of interests and an asymmetric conflict of values. The most important element, however, is Lumsden’s conclusion regarding the Greek and Turkish Cypriots’ actions and reactions to opposing contingencies.

For the Greek Cypriots at the time, there was little difference between *enosis* and peace. But war was the worst contingency of all and should be avoided at all costs. For the Turkish Cypriots, the correlation of peace and *taksim* was a much different situation: war was a better contingency than *enosis*. Within this perception is a prediction, or an interpretation perhaps, of the evolution that would occur in the crisis as it moved toward the establishment of the Greek coup in Cyprus and, eventually, the Turkish invasion. The fact that the Greek Cypriots, in contrast to the Turkish Cypriots, were negative in their reaction to the war scenario reflects the way the dictators in Greece felt

¹²⁷ Lumsden, “The Cyprus Conflict as a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game,” 7.

compelled to take over the situation in order to overcome the Greek and Greek-Cypriots' reluctance and deter the results of the Turkish Cypriots' decisiveness. On the other hand, this perception impelled the Turkish army to implement its territorial ambitions, instigated by Turkish sentiments, and assured that there would be no resistance and response from the Greek Cypriots, or the Greeks, by extension. This is not to say that this conception conducted to the brutal events, but that a change of balance in considering and evaluating war between the communities could easily predict that the crisis would evolve toward intervention and conflict on both sides.

b. *Individual Influences*

The leading actors in the Cyprus drama were undoubtedly the leaders of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities, Archbishop Makarios and Rauf Denktash, respectively. Makarios, the first and only president of an independent, democratic Cyprus, due to his religious affiliation and challenging attitude toward the powerful, acquired both fanatical disciples and rivals. Because of the many contradictions surrounding his name and the many accusations against him, he shares the same fate in history as the ancient Greek general Alcibiades.¹²⁸



Figure 9. The Cypriot “Ethnarch” and President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios.¹²⁹

Given his intelligence, his faith in God, and his confidence in his decisions, early in 1950 Makarios became Archbishop. After taking over the reins of

¹²⁸ The fate that history failed to judge them for their actions so far. See Footnote 18.

¹²⁹ Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Makarios_III. (May 2007).

Cyprus's political life, he was proclaimed Ethnarch and became the symbol of *enosis* to the Greek Cypriots. Makarios's political profile is as democratic as the religion he served. He struggled to achieve *enosis* through legitimate and publicly accepted means, mainly trying to obtain international support and recognition by the UN of the Greek-Cypriot right of self-determination. Unfortunately for him, the UN organization has no armed force of its own, but must rely on the military action of its members.¹³⁰ The United States and the western Europeans, who dominated the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the mid-50s, were against the *enosis* plans. They put an end to Makarios's hopes.¹³¹ Recognizing the lack of international support, Makarios compromised, offering the idea of an independent, democratic Cyprus. What Makarios meant by independence, however, was absolute disengagement from foreign factions. In interviews in both 1964 and 1974, Makarios¹³² conceded his opposition to an American settlement, whether through NATO or not, his repulsion of the Greek dictators, his sympathy for the Soviets, and his fear of the Turkish expansionism, emphasizing his democratic ideals and good knowledge of the international scene. His attitude, certainty, and faithfulness to his ideals, however, annoyed his many enemies, and his popularity in the Cypriot community was a great obstacle to their plans. Some of the Greeks who tried to kill him later accused him, and still do, of being a traitor to the Turks, of having asked the Turks to invade in order to maintain his power. But his appeal to U.S. President Ford, in which he asked for help to defend the Cypriots against the Turkish violations¹³³ and the fact that he was not re-enthroned by the Turks after the invasion contradict those claims.

¹³⁰ Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (102 Congress), Cyprus: International Law and the Prospects for Settlement (U.S. Government printing office, Washington 1991), 57.

¹³¹ In the mid-60s, after the influx of large numbers of African and Asian states (ex-colonies) into the organization, the Greek call would receive a more sympathetic hearing (Theodoros Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle* [New York: Praeger Publisher, 1983], 204).

¹³² Oriana Fallaci, An Interview with Archbishop Makarios III, November 1974. <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/makarios%20-%20interview%20with%20fallaci.htm>. (May 2007).

Richard Gilbert, Your Beatitude, Mr. President, interviewing Makarios 1964. Nicosia, Cyprus, 1964. http://www.threemonkeysonline.com/article_archbishop_makarios_richard_gilbert.htm. (May 2007).

¹³³ Message from President Makarios to President Ford.

Makarios tried to compromise with the opposing powers of the bi-natured Cypriot society, promoting new and common national prototypes, but he found himself exposed to diverse, potent fronts. One was the American–Soviet Cold War, now transferred to the Soviet border, very close to the most sensitive American interests. The other opposing front was the smaller Greco-Turkish Cold War, which had lasted for centuries. Another front comprised the inadequate and fragile democracies in the triangle – Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus – which focused their powers of reinforcement on the weakest apex of the triangle. At the same time, Makarios’s goal was to establish Cyprus as a self-contained state, independent of external bonds. Once that was accomplished, no one could influence or benefit from Cyprus’s distinctive strategic location and peculiar population in ways contrary to him and his people.

Rauf Denktash was the official representative of the Turkish-Cypriot community and its rights in the newly established constitutional democracy of 1960. At the same time, he also led the backstage struggle for *taksim*, backing the TMT terrorists, and creating the necessary provisions for Turkey to invade. As an extension of the Turkish plans, Denktash promoted a policy of separatism within the Cypriot community, in order to present the crisis as a communal, ethnic-rooted problem and sow dissension and terror among the Turks about their fate under the Greek administration.

This work of division took the form of several bombs aimed at Turkish-Cypriot targets, causing fear and then feelings of revenge against the Greeks of the island. They were meant to provoke a reaction against the democratic integrity of the communities and to convince the Turkish Cypriots to gather into enclaves for their own safety. According to Kutlu Adali, a Turkish journalist, in 1986 Denktash admitted on British television that he had ordered the first bombing against the Press office of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia on June 7, 1958.¹³⁴ A second bomb was exploded in front of Denktash’s law office, and the Greek Cypriots were again declared responsible. On September 17, 1962, a shot was fired outside Denkatsh’s office, but again he was absent and safe. According to a Turkish history professor, Dr. Fahir Armaoglu, both bombings

¹³⁴ Yennaris, *From the East*, 135.

were blamed on the Greeks, but had been placed by Denktash's orders in an effort to terrify and arouse the Turkish population. A similar thing happened in 1955 at Kemal Ataturk's house in Thessaloniki, which resulted in the destruction of tens of thousands of Greek properties, the killing of many, and the expulsion of thousands of others.¹³⁵

By March 31, 1964, under Denktash's orders 9,310 Turkish Cypriots from seventeen mixed villages were forced by the TMT to abandon their homes and move into enclaves, creating thirty-nine such enclaves in the north for 60 percent of the total Turkish population on Cyprus. On June 30, 1975, Denktash threatened to expel any Greeks remaining north of the Attila line (the green line) if his demands that all the Turkish Cypriots be transported to the area under Turkish troop control were not met.¹³⁶



Figure 10. The leader of the Turkish-Cypriots Rauf Denktash in 1974.¹³⁷

We have shown how the distinctive character of the Cypriot society affected the relationship between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities. We have also shown that the suspicious and prejudiced relations between Greeks and Turks created many preconditions that could bring them into conflict. Furthermore, a rival predisposition, massive conscription, and psychological pressure can easily drive different ethnic groups into conflict. And controversy between ethnic groups pursuing

¹³⁵ Yennaris, *From the East*, 136–7. Menderes and his regime's trial Minutes for the 27 May revolution revealed the Turkish responsibility for Ataturk's house bombing.

¹³⁶ Yennaris, *From the East*, 153, 215.

¹³⁷ Google, http://images.google.com/images?q=pictures+of+Denktas&ndsp=18&svnum=10&hl=en&rlz=1T4DMUS_enUS222US223&start=126&sa=N. (May 2007).

incompatible or mutually exclusive political goals¹³⁸ was occurring in Cyprus. So it would not be wrong to consider the Cyprus crisis as mainly an ethnic crisis before the agitations of 1963 which “abolished” the constitution of 1960 and, under some preconditions, before the intervention of the Greek coup.

In our examination of the internal crisis in Cyprus, we have shown, however, that despite the existence of many preconditions and predispositions within Cypriot society that could have driven the crisis into an ethnic conflict, the circumstances and events that led to the Greek military intervention and the Turkish invasion were not ethnic in nature. The conflict proved to be one of unvarnished violence against two communities that were always merely token participants and that influenced the conflict only by their exhaustion and their role as victims.

D. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: NATO AND THE UN

As we said earlier, international organizations are not self-contained, free-agent entities that can exert influence spontaneously on countries, crises, or agreements. It is up to their constituent members to decide whether or not they will use a combined force authorized by the organizations’ institutions to settle a disagreement. If the members are reluctant to take action and responsibility, the organization cannot act by itself. International organizations contributed to the Cyprus conflict by their absence, hesitancy, and indifference in securing the unprotected and unsafe democratic state. However, since the European Economic Community was structured to deal only with economic relations at the time, NATO and the UN cannot be blamed for their detached role during the Cyprus crisis.

1. NATO

NATO, following the American example, characterized the causes of the conflict as “ethnic” and tried to keep a safe distance from it and its conflicted members. NATO’s major goal was to maintain peace on the southeastern flank of the alliance, securing by that the alliance’s integrity and respect in relation to the Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War era. Regardless of the Cypriot problem, that goal could be achieved as long as Greece and Turkey were not fighting. So any approach to the problem by NATO was

¹³⁸ Joseph, *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict, and International Politics*, 6.

actually an effort to keep the Mediterranean region calm and nonviolent,¹³⁹ even if this was not a solution to the political and social instability of Cyprus.

In regard to NATO's initiative to intervene with a solution, the alliance could not take action when its members were reluctant for their own reasons to do so. The United States did not want to use NATO to resolve the problem by taking the side of either Greece or Turkey, and thus, displeasing the other. Taking one side or the other would have affected that country's future in the alliance and set an example for other intra-alliance disputes. Great Britain also did not want NATO's interference because that might mean transforming British bases into NATO bases. France, having lost colonies around the world that could only be maintained with NATO support, was also negative in regard to any NATO mediation or action while, at the same time, being sympathetic¹⁴⁰ to the Greek position of *enosis*.

Greece opposed the NATO peace plan¹⁴¹ of 1964 which provided for the deployment of 10,000 troops under NATO and deterred Greece and Turkey from intervention during the settlement. This was because the political resolution that would succeed the military command was derived from the Acheson Plan and was directed toward partition and double *enosis*. Turkey also, despite its having accepted the Acheson Plan as the basis of negotiations, was not happy with the idea of a 10,000-troop presence that would constrain its future ambitions to invade. Cyprus rejected the NATO peace plan for the same reasons that Greece did and also because Makarios did not want Cyprus to be aligned with NATO or to join with any other country or organization. Finally, NATO itself did not want to get involved in the Cyprus crisis and risk Soviet complaints, which could give rise to further involvement. Thus, it was impossible for NATO to determine any resolution for the island. One final aspect that negated the possibility of NATO military involvement concerns the democratic process and the island's future as an independent democratic state, which could not be established by force of arms.

¹³⁹ Philip Windsor, *NATO and the Cyprus Crisis* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964), 5–7.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Joseph, *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*, 83.

What can be said about NATO members is that the process followed in Cyprus was to first ask for Makarios's invitation¹⁴² before getting involved. Thus, it was not a dynamic and decisive intervention as in several other cases. In 1991, the U.S. Senate¹⁴³ harshly criticized the American "one law for the rich, one law for the poor" policy that favored Turkey's illegal actions in Cyprus but called for the imposition of strict measures on Iraq for the invasion of Kuwait.

2. The UN

The UN's involvement in the course of the Cyprus crisis is left final intentionally, in order to ease the process of transiting this study from the research part to critiques, assessments over future prospects and conclusions since the United Nations was charged with the responsibility to find a remedy.

In 1964, a few months after the agitation that disrupted the writing of the constitution for the now independent Cyprus, the UN decided to deploy UN forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). This force, which was responsible for the security of all Cypriots, became the longest-standing peacekeeping force of the United Nations.¹⁴⁴ However, the UN forces were not welcomed by the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots because it meant the end of the Turkish intervention.¹⁴⁵ The less than 2,000 deployed troops¹⁴⁶ were only capable of low-level operations and could not prevent major attacks by either side. While it would be wrong hold the UN troops responsible for failing to deter the Greek coup and the Turkish invasion, the UN was responsible for the policy put in force following the events of the summer of 1974, which continues today.

¹⁴² Windsor, *NATO and the Cyprus Crisis*, 7; Joseph, *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*, 84.

¹⁴³ Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *Cyprus*, 1.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 41.

¹⁴⁵ Windsor, *NATO and the Cyprus Crisis*, 11.

¹⁴⁶ The UN force stood at 1,425 troops in 1992 (Tad Szulc, *Peacekeeping and Diplomacy In Cyprus: 1964–1993* [Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Council Case Study Series on Ethics and International Affairs, 1994], 7.

UN Resolution 3212,¹⁴⁷ which was approved and signed on 1 November 1974, was overtly unfair to Cyprus and its democratic future. In the final draft approved by the General Assembly, terms like “Turkey,” “invasion,” “occupation,” and “raid” are absent. Moreover, there is no talk about either condemning the Turkish invasion or imposing any countermeasures against the intruder. Instead, the two Cypriot communities are called upon, as before the invasion, to continue negotiations to find a mutually acceptable solution, as if nothing had changed on the island in the last few months.¹⁴⁸

Resolution 3212 does not even raise the issue of Turkey. Instead, it satisfies the demands of Turkey and its Western allies by not asking for military countermeasures. It addresses none of Cyprus’s needs or problems. The Eastern Bloc countries were satisfied with the structure and terminology of the text because it required all the armies to withdraw, thereby effectively demilitarizing the island. It also called for the removal of the British military bases and a weakening of NATO’s influence in the area. For the same reasons, the resolution was supported by members of the Non-aligned Movement, because the text accented the nonaligned nature of Cyprus, instead of its engagement with either Greece and Turkey or any other international organization. For the first time in global history, a state was identified as belonging to a particular international environment – the nonaligned one – before its government and people had even expressed an opinion.¹⁴⁹

The resolution was censured by the Greek-Cypriot community because the term “equality,” according to which the negotiations were structured, equalized politically and institutionally the two Cypriot communities as if they were equal in numbers. Finally, the United Nations’s presence in Cyprus, by securing a buffer zone across the 112-mile green line and peace between the communities, achieved only quiescence to and postponement of attempts to find a solution.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ UN Resolution No. 3212. 1974. The Hellenic Electronic Center, Cyprus, <http://www.greece.org/cyprus/UNRes3212.htm>. (May 2007).

¹⁴⁸ Glafkos Clerides, in Tassos Chatzianastasiou, *Cyprus and Change-over: The Complex of Defeat* (Alternative Publishing, 2004), 46.

¹⁴⁹ Chatzianastasiou, *Cyprus and Change-over*, 49.

¹⁵⁰ Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Cyprus, 28.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V. ASSESSING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

A. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The conflict in Cyprus occurred within a context of significant international interventionism, always in favor of interests foreign to Cyprus. The international system failed both to resolve the crisis before it took on international dimensions and to reach a compromise afterward among the multiple opposing forces. From 1955 on, the international community had had multiple opportunities to solve the Cyprus problem. During the early years, the interested foreign governments failed to evaluate the crisis's significance, and thus, lost the opportunity to settle the situation at a time when one of the parties was indifferent and the other was not yet fully engaged. Other failures include the creation in 1960 of an unworkable constitution for Cyprus and the involvement of dangerous players in the game.

During the eleven years after the constitution's collapse in 1963, members of the international community consulted and compromised, eventually forcing the Greek Cypriot president to make concessions. As a result, what had been enemies became opposing sides. It also changed the nature of the playing field, giving total freedom of action to Greece and Turkey to control the situation by a display of force. The international system's failure to cure the thirty-two-year-old long-suffering Cyprus and reunite its divided land and people is a weakness that continues today. Unfortunately, as long as the international community continues to make the mistakes of the past and searches for a solution that reconciles Greece and Turkey, but not the Cypriots, the issues will remain unresolved.

The international system did not deter the crisis in Cyprus from ending in conflict, because it was asymmetrical in nature. The balance of power that adjusts international relations between countries and system has an incompatible attribute, a two-speed adaptability on any scale change of balances. This means that many times the international system indicates quite flexible capabilities to fit and accept a status change inside its range, while simultaneously being unable to permit and accommodate other

changes or the same changes in a small sequence of time. The Cyprus crisis in particular encountered both the international system's flexible and its inflexible process of acceptance.

At first it was the awkwardness of the international system to take on the revolutionary tendency of the Greek Cypriots to attempt *enosis* and, later, nonaligned independence, which endangered the fragile stability in the sensitive southeastern Mediterranean. Kissinger and other Western leaders viewed Cyprus in the same way that the Austro-Hungarian Metternich and the British Castlereagh viewed the 1821 Greek insurrection against the Ottomans. In their view, the Greek revolution opposed their own efforts to reconstitute the European balance of power and establish safe nation-state associations against the liberal and revolutionary currents of the post-Napoleon era. Indeed, in both eras, the background threat was the Russian finger which backed the subversive elements and challenged the status quo. The Western bloc led by Kissinger considered Cyprus and its independent-minded president, Makarios, as a threat to the stability of the North Atlantic Alliance. “But neither Metternich nor Kissinger nor the Cold War architects made room in their policies for the politics of change and redistribution that were at work in their respective areas.”¹⁵¹

After the crisis escalated, however, the international system of balances adopted the flexibility of Realpolitik which adjusts antagonisms and conflicts according to the current balance of power. “Realpolitik solves international problems based on the existing distribution of power rather than on a sense of international right and justice.”¹⁵² Thus, international relations followed the mandates of realism instead of the emotionalism that the right of self-determination emitted. Hence Cyprus became the prey of the international scene which shifted to “expedient rather than principled behavior.”

According to Realpolitik, peace is a result of a “decisive imbalance of power.” But in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey were chasing with equal possibilities, according to their history, dominance against each other. The international factor taught the Cypriots

¹⁵¹ Stern, *The Wrong Horse*, 159–162.

¹⁵² Scherer, *Blocking the Sun*, 97.

how fragile power balances or even alliances are when confronted with Realpolitik interests. Because of their historical and common religious bonds, Makarios invested in the Russian factor, forgetting how constrained those had become under communist dominance. Communism is a nonreligious theory of life; Greece was under the American democratic influence. Makarios also failed to understand that with the culmination of the Cuban crisis, the Cold War was slanted toward the Americans, awaiting the Soviet Union's collapse. It would have been unwise and contrary to its own contemporary interests for anyone to go against the Western powers and have faith in a dynamic Soviet intervention.

Hence, naturally, the crisis in Cyprus followed a Realpolitik course and favored Turkey's ambitions which were (and still are) substantially for a better strategic position and economic and business opportunities. This is typically the course that high-intensity and wide-ranging crises usually follow. When those relax, the international system of balances shifts back into principled behavior. Using the logic of Realpolitik and connecting all the links in the chain and pieces of the puzzle, we get a clear picture of the Cyprus conflict that also corresponds to conspiracy theories. In order to separate ourselves from emotional and prejudiced assumptions and to find a dispassionate, rational solution to the problem, it is important to also separate the events from conspiracy theories.

The American secret services did not plan the Turkish invasion, nor was it ordered by Henry Kissinger. No documents have been found or are going to be found to prove those theories. A consecutive sequence of events, influenced by external factors, drove the crisis along a no-way-back course having few opportunities to avoid conflict. The responsibilities of the Americans were discussed in the previous chapter. There was probably no secret plan that established either the 1967 military coup in Greece or the 1974 Turkish plans for division. In fact, the American side adversely affected democratic rule in Greece, because it expected to give power to the anti-American Central Union in the elections of 1964 by easing the army's intervention, even if conflict broke out in a different way. The Greek colonels, ambitious for Cypriot self-determination and receiving important political support as a government from the United States, tried to

annex Cyprus by force. That cannot be considered a Greek intervention, since the colonels had no legitimate authority from either the government or the Greek people. For Turkey, whose plans to divide Cyprus were well known by the United States, the colonels' intervention as an excuse to go ahead with the invasion. As we have said, the only things America was interested in were keeping the invasion under control, securing peace in the region, and maintaining the integrity of NATO's southeastern flank. The Soviet-Turkish rapprochement justified the American compliance in the Turkish plans as a Turkish attempt to blackmail the United States. From immediately after the invasion until today, the international community, including the United States, has tried to protect the resulting insecure peace, searching politically and diplomatically for a way to compromise. The bloody events of 1996, in which two Greek Cypriot civilians were killed by Turkish Cypriot civilians, prove how unsafe the peace accomplished by the Turkish invasion really is. In the long run, the invasion damaged the cause of the Turkish Cypriots more than it benefited Turkey.

B. CONSEQUENCES OF THE MILITARY VIOLENCE

The diplomatic victory that the Turks achieved by the 1960 London agreement, which gave Turkey the legal right to intervene in Cyprus whenever they judged that the Turkish Cypriots' security was threatened, offered them a good chance to invade if a sufficient opportunity should arise. Thus, in August 1974, Turkish troops invaded Cyprus, capturing the northern 37 percent of the island and creating the desired autonomous territory for the Turkish Cypriots. The transference of the Greek Cypriot population to the south that followed created an almost ethically pure and safe region, and, more important, disentangled the dispersed Turkish population from the burden and imposition of the dominant and rich Greek Cypriots. As a result, Turkey could exert a direct political influence on and had military access to the territory. Thus, it could exert stronger pressure on the Greek Cypriot community. In sum, the invasion brought internal political benefits to leaders of Turkey, increased the Turkish Cypriots' power as a political entity, and strengthened Turkey's bargaining position at the UN. Hence, Turkey gained political, strategic, and bargaining benefits from the invasion.

In the long run, however, those benefits would prove inadequate and even damaging for both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Denktash's declaration on December 15, 1983, of the occupied territory as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus did not go over well anywhere in the world except Turkey. And since the invasion, the Turkish Cypriots have been isolated from the international community, imprisoned by the Turkish army. An economic embargo imposed by the EEC impoverished them even more at a time when the Greek-Cypriot community was enjoying an economic heyday. Indeed, after the invasion the economic growth of the Greek Cypriot economy was explosive. Since 1974, the Gross National Product per capita has increased more than 1000 percent, to \$15,000,¹⁵³ and the number of tourists visiting free Cyprus per year has exceeded the island's population five times over, reaching 2,696,700 in 2001.¹⁵⁴ In contrast, the monthly income of the Turkish Cypriots, from being ten times lower, has managed in thirty years only to double. As a result, many thousands of Turkish Cypriots have emigrated and the Turkish government has sent colonists from eastern Turkey to resettle the evacuated Greek-Cypriot properties.¹⁵⁵

But the Turkish Cypriot community's greatest loss after the invasion was its legal right to self-determination and autonomy. The violence of 1974 and the persisting illegal occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkish troops abrogated the rights of the Turkish community, not because it was responsible for the invasion, but because the law of arms replaced international law and controlled their property. International law is theoretical; it becomes meaningful only when a governing body accepts it and authorizes its implementation. Not only did the invasion not make the Turkish Cypriot community's life better, it eliminated any psychological support for its rights that it might have had from the international system. The imposition of arms brought the Turkish Cypriots a terrible fate: it made them citizens of a nonstate. In other words, in 1974, the Turkish

¹⁵³ Scherer, *Blocking the Sun*, 87; "More than 20,000 wealthy Lebanese resettled in the island and invested in business boosting the embattled Cypriot economy. They were followed by Serbs, and more recently by Russians" (45).

¹⁵⁴ Chatzianastasiou, *Cyprus and Change-over*, 129.

¹⁵⁵ Tozun Bahcheli, "The Cypriot Challenge for Turkey: The Conquests of 1974 to be Maintained," in *Current Turkey* (Athens: Papazisis Publishings, 2002), 611.

army imprisoned the Turkish Cypriots on the island where they are now ignored by the European Union. In 2004, the EU, which recognizes the Greek Cypriot government as the only legal and representative government on the island, accepted Cyprus as a member of the European family, leaving the Turkish Cypriots abandoned to their fate under military law.

Despite the doubtful and distant possibility of Turkey becoming a member, the Turkish-Cypriots might have been brought into the European Union along with the Greek Cypriots. But they failed to make the necessary concessions after the invasion to “maintain the conquests of 1974,” just as the Greek Cypriots had failed to make concessions regarding the Turkish-Cypriot question between 1964 and 1974, which drove the crisis in Cyprus to the brink.

In any event, Turkey threatened the European Union that it would annex the northern part, or even the whole island, if Cyprus was accepted as a member. Its threat was unsuccessful because the Turkish Cypriots did not want to be assimilated by Turkey since that would not have improved their position.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, any additional confrontation would further harm the already damaged image of Turkish diplomacy and might destroy forever Turkey’s dream of European membership.

The greater irony in the Cyprus conflict is that since the invasion the terms and positions of all sides have been turned upside down. Since 2004, as a full member of the EU, Cyprus can veto Turkey’s candidacy at any time unless Turkey withdraws its troops. Cyprus can also freeze any economic assistance for Turkey and deny the revocation of the Turkish Cypriots’ economic isolation. Cyprus can do this because, since the summer of 1974 when it lost people, peace, a democratic constitution, and its territorial integrity, it has nothing more to lose.

Thirty years after the dispersion of violence, in the summer of 2004, the Greek Cypriots denied the Turkish population its dream of joining the European Union by

¹⁵⁶ Oliver P Richmond, Ethno-nationalism, Sovereignty, and Negotiating Positions in the Cyprus Conflict: Obstacles to a Settlement (London, July 1999).
<http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?index=9&did=44038945&SrchMode=1&sid=3&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1144820061&clientId=11969&cfc=1>. (March 2007).

voting NO to a UN plan. The plan sustained separatism by simply making small differentiations in the current buffer zones and maintained the climate of suspicion and ethnic rivalry created by the green line. The Greek Cypriots' denial, however, was not really directed at the Turkish Cypriots, but at Turkey. It was intended to demonstrate the Cypriot government's improved bargaining position. Furthermore, the reciprocal peaceful feelings of the two communities were reaffirmed when, after Denktash's "few hours" permission in April 2004, many Greek Cypriots visited their abandoned properties in the occupied zone. The Cypriot government, knowing that Turkey has no other choice if it wants to join the EU, is going to set a high price on its veto power. It will try to turn back the clock thirty-two years and avert the deadlock and accomplished facts of the invasion. As James Callaghan, the British minister of foreign affairs, predicted in 1974 to his Turkish counterpart during the second phase of the Geneva talks, "today Cyprus may be a hostage of your army, but later your army will be Cyprus's hostage."¹⁵⁷

C. CRITIQUE OF THE UN PLAN

On March 31, 2004, the United Nations completed the last of five plans drafted since 1974 in an effort to find the much desired compromise solution to the Cyprus conflict. This plan, commonly known as the Kofi Annan Plan,¹⁵⁸ the most well-wrought of the five plans, was unsuccessful. On April 24, 2004, it was rejected by the Greek Cypriot people with a 78-percent vote against. Since they considered it the best one yet, the engineers and mediators of the plan could not hide their disappointment and pessimism after its rejection. And some did not hesitate to express publicly that they felt betrayed by the Cypriot government that disapproved it, leaving no hope or chance of a solution to the problem.

The plan, however, though very descriptive and analytical, failed to guarantee the island's security. Like previous plans, it treated the problem like an ethnic conflict, and thus, simply duplicated past mistakes that should not have been repeated. We derived this assumption, that the United Nations treated the Cyprus crisis like an ethnic conflict, from the fact that the mediations failed to seek the island's demographic and territorial

¹⁵⁷ Chatzianastasiou, "Cyprus and Change-over," 139.

¹⁵⁸ UN, Annan Plan. http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf. (May 2007).

integration. Rather, they settled for a peaceful, acceptable, institutionalized division, as if the division had been caused by the two communities' reciprocal hate; as if they had asked for the intervention of a Greek coup and a Turkish invasion; as if both communities, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, had gambled with their properties and their futures in an international chess game. Page seven of the plan evidences that separatism: "The status and relationship of the United Cyprus Republic, its federal government, and its constituent states is modeled on the status and relationship of Switzerland, its federal government, and its cantons."¹⁵⁹

UN Resolution 3212 did not condemn the Turkish invasion and did not assign countermeasures against Turkey. All the plans were oriented to compromise the Greco-Turkish rivalry and put pressure on the Cypriot representatives, instead of asking the Cypriot people. Thus, they impugn the United Nations' credibility and decisiveness. While it would be wrong to judge so overtly the many years and the many pages of work in a few lines, the United Nations' persistence in considering solutions that maintained separatism and its acceptance of the accomplished facts of the invasion are questionable, if not damning, factors.

The United Nations failed to find a solution to the Cyprus problem because, like the main international participants, it considered the crisis an ethnic dispute and ignored the determinative influence of external factors. The United Nations failed because it mistakenly believed that the conflict would be instantly resolved once a detailed legal and political document was agreed to and signed by the conflicted parties.¹⁶⁰ The United Nations failed because it mistakenly thought the Cypriots were exhausted in the pursuit of their right to freedom and independence after thirty-two weary years of negotiations. The United Nations failed because, even with the fifth plan, it tried to mislead the Cypriot population again to the tragic agreement of 1960, despite its insubstantial modifications. The term "Cypriot population" includes equally the Turkish Cypriots because even if

¹⁵⁹ UN, Annan Plan, 7.

¹⁶⁰ Richmond, "Ethno-nationalism, Sovereignty and Negotiating Positions in the Cyprus Conflict. <http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?index=9&did=44038945&SrchMode=1&sid=3&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1144820061&clientId=11969&cfc=1>. (March 2007).

they voted for the plan in the summer of 2004, their seemingly endless international, economic, and political isolation weighed heavier on them than the unfair and unsafe plan.

In addition, like the 1960 Constitution, the fifth UN plan granted special rights to Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain:

This Agreement shall enter into force upon approval by each side at separate simultaneous referenda conducted in accordance with the Agreement and the signature by Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of the Treaty on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus.¹⁶¹

Why should this plan offer a legitimized right and argument to any country, after its invasion and annexation of the whole of Cyprus, at a postwar negotiations table? The Greek Cypriots rejected directly any opening of a door that would give rise again to foreign intervention in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots also would not have approved any foreign intervention that, like the last one, deprived them of their freedom and rights. However, for them, the Annan Plan was their only chance of escape from isolation.

The UN plan dedicates a whole chapter to the balance of power between the interested foreign parties: “Treaty between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom Related to the New State of Affairs in Cyprus.”¹⁶² It also provides for the demilitarization of the island and the gradual withdrawal of all Greek and Turkish forces. But before that process could be accomplished, the plan, inspired again by the disastrous London agreement, stipulated a three-year presence of armies of both sides: “the Greek contingent not to exceed 950, all ranks, and the Turkish contingent not to exceed 650, all ranks; thereafter, subject to a three-year review with the objective of total withdrawal.”¹⁶³

The great irony is that the three years following the London agreement, 1960 to 1963, were enough to break down peace and democracy in Cyprus despite the presence of 950 and 650 troops, respectively, and a few thousand UN Blue Helmets. And yet, the

¹⁶¹ UN, Annan Plan, 15.

¹⁶² Ibid., 144–158.

¹⁶³ UN, Annan Plan, 12.

UN secured through the plan close to a million lives, again trusting the same numbers and analogies, as if everything had worked out successfully back then. The next question is, who, how, and under what attribute will someone use the guns that the United Nations allowed in Cyprus for each state? In particular, how can an island be considered *demilitarized* when it has 50 battle tanks, 180 infantry vehicles, 18 towed artillery pieces, 18 air defense missiles, 6 transport helicopters, 4 light helicopters, 16 air defense canons,¹⁶⁴ and other military equipment for each constituent state?

The related proposals tend to focus Greek Cypriot fears on foreign intervention, mainly from Turkey. For as long as the United Nations tries to maintain measures that exert influence and satisfy primarily Greek, Turkish, and British interests, the Cypriots will disapprove of any proposed solution. Other equally important aspects of the UN plan also deterred the Greek Cypriots from approving both it, and probably any future plan that would include the same conditions.

The Cypriot government tried repeatedly to convince the international community that the equity between the communities concerned rights and negotiations, not political status or populations that were unequal in size and economic status.¹⁶⁵ Indeed, the fifth plan equalized the communities as political entities. Thus, the Greek Cypriots would share the burden of the Turkish Cypriots' economic depression by the construction of one united Federal bank but would support the federal state by providing 75 percent of the total taxation.

Acknowledging each other's distinct identity and integrity and that our relationship is not one of majority and minority but of political equality where neither side may claim authority or jurisdiction over the other.¹⁶⁶

Under the same rhetoric:

The federal government shall be composed of a Council of Ministers of six members (three Greek Cypriots, three Turkish Cypriots). Delegates from each constituent state parliament shall sit in the transitional federal

¹⁶⁴ UN, Annan Plan, 159.

¹⁶⁵ Chatzianastasiou, "Cyprus and Change-over," 49.

¹⁶⁶ UN, Annan Plan, 6.

Parliament (24 Greek Cypriots, 24 Turkish Cypriots) and in the European Parliament (four Greek Cypriots, two Turkish Cypriots).¹⁶⁷

Later, the UN plan adjusts the bilateral relationship: “The constituent states are of equal status.”¹⁶⁸

The fifth UN plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots also for economic reasons. These concerned the 280,000 Cypriots who had lost their property during the invasion and population displacement. Compensation would be offered only to the few thousands of those who were dispossessed of property before the entry-into-force date of the fifth plan: “In areas subject to territorial adjustment, properties shall be reinstated to dispossessed owners.”¹⁶⁹ Even worse, the compensations would represent only a small percentage of the property’s actual worth: “Dispossessed owners who opt for compensation, as well as institutions, shall receive full and effective compensation for their property on the basis of value at the time of dispossession adjusted to reflect appreciation of property values in comparable locations.”¹⁷⁰

However, what was most important to the Cypriot government was to keep the bargaining advantage inherent in its becoming a member of the European Union. This was the only chance Cyprus would have to counterbalance the advantage that the accomplished facts offered Turkey and to press for a fair solution that would include withdrawal of troops. The fifth plan obligated Cyprus, however, to resign the Turkish candidacy as a sort of “blank check.”

Cyprus shall maintain special ties of friendship with Greece and Turkey, respecting the balance in Cyprus established by the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance and this Agreement, and as a European Union member state shall support the accession of Turkey to the Union.

¹⁶⁷ UN, Annan Plan, 11.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 18.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 13.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 13–14.

Going back to the “ethnic conflict” issue, the UN, through the fifth plan, shows it believes the solution is to maintain separatism on the island. The division of the island is being institutionalized by a dividing line that separates the constituent parts of the federal state. The plan would change the dividing line from today’s green line and allow each of the states access to more land, but neither of the constituent states would be able to gain back their lost property or buy property from the other state. As we said before, compensation will be given only to areas affected by territorial adjustments; no one else will be allowed to live in and own property in the other constituent state.

[T]he application of restrictions, on a non-discriminatory basis, on the right of natural persons in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, and of legal persons, to purchase immovable property in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state without permission of the competent authority of that constituent state, for fifteen years or for as long as the gross domestic product per capita in that constituent state does not reach the level of 85% of the gross domestic product per capita in the Greek Cypriot state, whichever is the earlier, shall not be precluded.¹⁷¹

And several lines later:

[T]he application of restrictions, on a non-discriminatory basis, on the right of a Cypriot citizen to reside in a constituent state of which he does not hold the internal constituent state citizenship status shall not be precluded, if the percentage of such residents of the total population of a municipality or village has reached 6% between the 6th and 9th years and 12% between the 10th and 14th years following the date of entry into force of this Act.¹⁷²

These limitations will affect all Cypriots, but only the Greek Cypriots can afford to invest or even to repurchase their properties in the north. The plan is intended to maintain the island’s demography as it was configured after the invasion and the population relocations. In order to secure the uniformity of the constituent states, however, in the fifth plan the United Nations restricts the people of both states from residing in or reclaiming properties in the other constituent state. The persisting separatism authorized by such a plan would create two autonomous but ethnically and

¹⁷¹ UN, Annan Plan, 167.

¹⁷² Ibid.

religiously separate states. In other words, the UN plan, in effect, would move the borders of Greece to South Nicosia and the borders of Turkey to North Nicosia, giving a sense of double enosis with autonomous districts in Cyprus. The nonsensical modification of the current green line is just a diplomatic trick to win the Cyprus government's acceptance. The maps below show the line of division as it is today and as it will be after the acceptance of the fifth UN plan. The division is obvious; the territorial changes make no sense.

D. CYPRUS TODAY



Figure 11. Map of Cyprus Today.¹⁷³

¹⁷³ UN, Annan Plan.




Figure 12. Cyprus after the UN Plan's Entry into Force¹⁷⁴

Establishing a Turkish state beside a Greek state, without buffer zones and without also trying to ease the ethnic rivalry and acknowledge the recent gory past, would be an immature and dangerous decision. Furthermore, the events in Derinya in the summer of 1996 indicate that the wounds of the invasion have not healed. This is because the application of restrictions cannot prevent an owner who was dispossessed during the invasion from using violence against those who expelled him from property inherited from his father. The UN initiative to add a blue stripe for Greek Cypriots and a red stripe for Turkish Cypriots to the current Cyprus flag¹⁷⁵ indicates an intention to denote a secured marriage of two different ethnic entities.

The United Nations, intending to recognize and institutionalize the existence of two distinct ethnic entities and emphasize the survival of the Turkish Cypriots, created a plan that promotes the ethnic dimensions and imposes the populations' separation into two secure sectors. The United Nations and the international system in general fails to

¹⁷⁴ UN, Annan Plan.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 20.

understand that the Greco-Turkish problem began at the time the populace was divided, since the two communities not only had many things in common to divide – land, the military, trade – but also a long history of coexistence.

Even the protectionist character of the plan in regard to the rights of minorities in the constituent states emphasizes the separatism inside the states, by calling on them to live in different villages rather than peacefully accepting the differences. “Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots living in specified villages in the other constituent state shall enjoy cultural, religious and educational rights and shall be represented in the constituent state legislature.”¹⁷⁶ A document and a regulation cannot protect Cyprus’s minorities, but assimilation can

The United Nations made two major mistakes in considering its solution to the Cyprus conflict. First, it ignored the persisting interventionism that maintains Cyprus’s connection to Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain. That interrelationship distorts the democratic character of the federal state and endangers once more the island’s territorial integrity. Second, the UN ignored the persisting separatism which maintains the division of the island, enhancing the ethnic and religious differences and propagating feelings of distrust and prejudice.

The United Nations tried to establish safety for both regimes and secure reciprocal respect by imposing separatism. Respect for the different however cannot be ordered or assured; it must be inspired. The region cannot be protected from ethnic or religious friction if the populations live apart from one another or are segregated in enclaves. Only their social assimilation can defeat distrust, vengefulness, and prejudice by transferring the struggle to individual small groups, instead of large groups whether national or religious. This concept for a solution, is presented in the next and final chapter, the thesis conclusion.

¹⁷⁶ UN, Annan Plan, 9.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VI. CONCLUSION-FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR A SOLUTION IN CYPRUS

This study has tried through its chapters, analyzing one by one the related factors, to demonstrate the importance and influence of foreign interests' interventionism in Cyprus. It has also tried to distinguish this conflict from those generally labeled "ethnic conflicts" and to disconnect the ethnic-related influences from the highly determinative actors that conducted the crisis toward a division of the island. Regardless of whether the Cyprus conflict was an ethnic conflict or not, we are nonetheless certain that today's problems are synonymous with the division of the island. We believe further that this division is not a result of ethnic antipathy, but of its imposition after the Turkish invasion. In other words, even if ethnic dimensions were crucial during the generation of the crisis, the evolution and final result of the crisis came from the atrocious violence of the terror groups and the foreign national armies.

We saw that the United Nations' efforts to find a satisfactory solution were based on theories applicable to ethnic conflicts. All of the UN plans indicate the hesitant disposition of that organization and, by extension, the reluctance of the international system to assert a radical and decisive solution that would eliminate the problem rather than just compromise with and gain compliance from the opposing parties.

This study concludes by outlining a radical and risky plan that could bring a credible and feasible solution to the Cyprus problem. The plan is based on the theory that the crisis was not an ethnic conflict. It assumes that the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities can co-exist in mutual respect and according to peaceful agreements.

The plan also imagines a new form of modern liberal democracy based on the philosophy of the free-market economy. Just as the free-market economy abrogates price restrictions and eliminates the control of the central state in consolidating partial economies and ignoring ethnic, religious, social, and even political distinctiveness, this new plan abrogates the lines of division and ethnic backgrounds and intends to assimilate the separate communities into one integrated state. Greek and Turkish Cypriots become

members of a united state with equal rights and responsibilities as individuals, regardless of their ethnic identity. Qualifications, credentials, studies, and objective studies will be the fundamental criteria for structuring the new state and new society, again regardless of national derivation. A scientific committee, supported and nominated by the international scientific community and comprised of those who embrace the ideals of integration of diverging nationalities will decide the details and appraisals.

The population will be encouraged and subsidized to resettle and invest freely in the admixture of peoples in order to create areas of indistinct ethnicity. Greek and Turkish Cypriot property owners, who were dispossessed during the invasion and transportation, will be able to return to their properties. And the new Cypriot government, along with the EU, will be responsible for compensating those whose properties were captured with new ones. In this way, the Greek Cypriots will be satisfied morally and the Turkish Cypriots economically, since their properties in the south have multiplied in value since 1974.

The administration of this state will be assigned to a political party that will consist of delegates elected from the mixed-population regions. So the government will be a mixture of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot political representatives, according to the results of simultaneous local elections, regardless of ethnic participation percentages. The Constitution and other official government documents will be written in both Turkish and Greek and will not include articles distinguishing Greek Cypriots from Turkish Cypriots. All the detailed decisions, mandates, and rights will concern all citizens equally. The public administration will be based on the same structure and consist of mixed-ethnicity members with no determining percentages. New appointments will be adjusted according to a general list of qualifications, whether this creates a public sector comprised of 2 percent or 80 percent Turkish Cypriots. The current advantage of the Greek Cypriots will be a future challenge to the Turkish Cypriots to reverse this trend. This will not lead to any kind of dangerous of dominant authority of one group or the other, however, because competition will be among individuals, not social or ethnic groups.

An integrated Cyprus that includes northern Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots as a full member of the European Union, will enjoy the total protection and economic support of Europe. The European Union, through the European Security and Defense Policy organization, will take over Cyprus's initial demilitarization. They will replace the UN, Greek, and Turkish forces with European, Greek Cypriot, and Turkish Cypriot troops under an ESDP command which will be responsible for the Cypriot troops' training. Thus, the plan is intended for the future to create a solid Cypriot army, of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, of about 10,000 troops. This force will be sufficient to protect the island's integrity from external threats in this sensitive geographic area, but will remain under the ESDP's short- or long-term command. All its arms and military supplies will be controlled by the ESDP even after the island becomes self-sufficient in providing protection. The plan provides for the transformation of the British bases into ESPD/NATO bases with built-in flexibility for further transformation under other Cyprus-generated agreements.

The state we envision will have two official languages, Greek and Turkish, which will be taught in all schools, which will be mixed, since this is considered the most difficult part of the plan, at least during its first years of implementation. It will be very difficult to create a common and mutual understanding between those who have been taught for thirty-two years that they are enemies. Nonetheless, a common currency, market, political ideology and direction, mutual interests, and coexistence are fundamental and promising elements for a homogeneous society. A Cypriot Cyprus is not an inspiration that intends to eliminate any national element of the general population or to uproot the emotional and historical bonds with the ethnic motherlands. It is not a plan that asks Cypriots to deny their origins, but to see this settlement as a natural culmination of their long-time coexistence.

Furthermore, history cannot be erased nor pain forgotten. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriot civilians have suffered grievously from foreign interventions and lost loved ones. However, a Cypriot Cyprus calls both communities to use their mutually painful past as a lever to a new mutually beneficial future. With wise political leadership, mistakes of the past can become ideals of togetherness. Most important, however, no plan should

sacrifice territorial integrity for self-determination. Democratic principles and the deliverance from ethnic, religious, and social discrimination may prove strong enough to reorientate any opposing self-determination processes toward more-common values and a pattern of parallel self-determination.

Our plan is designed to compensate for the weaknesses of the UN plan which denies freeing Cyprus from its dependence on Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain and protecting the island from definitive division. Part one of the plan depends on the decisiveness of the international community in trusting in the survivability and health of Cyprus's economy and the European Union's political and economic support. For this reason the plan will seek verification and acceptance directly from the Cypriot people. It bypasses the Greek, Turkish, and British leadership, so as to avoid negotiations with indirect benefits, and the obsolete and prejudiced political powers in Cyprus, searching through referendum for support directly from all segments of the populace.

Part two of the plan depends on the willingness of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to exceed their past efforts and defeat the separatist forces that are driven by internal passions and external influences. It also depends on their willingness to develop and maintain basic common principles, interests, ideas, psychologies, and goals. The study is confident that this approach can be successful because it is grounded in the circumstances that existed at the onset of the crisis. The generation of the Greek Cypriots' idea of *enosis* was not a result of anti-Turkish feelings, but rather a reaction to the grueling British administration. In fact, until the first propaganda offensives of the British and Turkish conspiracy, the two Cypriot communities' shared sentiments of oppression actually brought them closer together.

Subsequently, the Turkish Cypriots fought against *enosis* and in favor of *taksim*. This was a more or less typical reaction for an ethnic group living in a foreign state. Since the invasion, the Greek Cypriots have attained significant economic progress and succeeded, from a European perspective, in showing a mature willingness to enter into a mutual, reciprocal, and transnational interdependence and to be assimilated into the

global culture.¹⁷⁷ The Turkish Cypriots, by voting in favor of the UN plan, rid themselves of their shortsighted and ethnically arrant leader, Rauf Denktash, manifesting for a first time democratic ideals and their desperation to be freed from the imposition of the arms sanctions.

The road toward integration is long and fanatical nationalistic groups on both sides continue to exploit the no-solution situation and benefit from the perpetuation of injustice. However, the new state must not submit to the demands of unstable entities that may endanger Cyprus's future security.¹⁷⁸ Both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots recognize the importance of integration because both have been betrayed by the ideals of nationalism generated by their motherlands. They now believe that endorsing nationalism would only make them minorities within their own land and country.

The political and social unification and integration of the island is of a risky proposition. But enduring problems such as Cyprus may necessitate radical plans. The degree of risk could be decreased, however, by a simultaneous improvement in Greco-Turkish relations and the continuous and dynamic support of the EU, the UN, and NATO.

Since April of 2004, Cyprus's great, tempestuous journey, which began thousands of years ago, has followed a European course, waiting for the island's Turkish population to find a safe solution to the Cyprus problem. Inspired by John L. Scherer's book, *Blocking the Sun: The Cyprus Conflict*, we view this journey like Homer's *Odyssey*: the long return trip of Odysseus, imposed by the ancient Greek gods as a punishment for his participation in the conquest of Troy. That odyssey ended only when the gods mercifully and justly ended Odysseus's enchantment in response to his endurance and survival of many trials and tribulations. Similarly, after being bedeviled by foreign and greater powers, Cyprus deserves mercy, justice, and a fair wind to find its way back to Ithaca, where its people can live peacefully and happily ever after.

¹⁷⁷ Richmond Oliver P., Ethno-nationalism, Sovereignty, and Negotiating Positions in the Cyprus Conflict: Obstacles to a Settlement (London, July 1999), an Internet report.

¹⁷⁸ Richmond, Ethno-nationalism, Sovereignty and Negotiating Positions in the Cyprus Conflict.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX

WMC186 WAD268(1457)(1-149349G221)PP 08/09/74 1456

ICS IPMIIHA IISS

IISS FM RCA 09 1456

PMS WASHINGTON DC

WUE0698 UWS142 LGD353

URNX BY GBLG 133

LONDON1G 133 9 1847 PAGE 1/52

ETATPRIORITE

HIS EXCELLENCY MR GERALD FORD

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WHITEHOUSE

WASHINGTONDC

ON THE ASSUMPTION OF YOUR HIGH DUTIES AS PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I CONVEY TO YOU MY HEARTIEST
CONGRATULATIONS AND WARMEST WISHES FOR EVERY SUCCESS IN THE
MOST DIFFICULT TASK THAT LIES AHEAD STOP

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12816 Sec. 3.2 (c)

NSC 04r 4/2/89 MR88-15-#23

By KBH Date 5/7/89



COL ETATPRIORITE

LGD353 HIS PAGE 2/50

AS YOU ARE AWARE MR PRESIDENT CYPRUS IS GOING THROUGH
TRAGIC AND CRITICAL TIMES STOP I APPEAL TO YOU TO INTERVENE
URGENTLY SO THAT AN END
MAY BE PUT TO THE VIOLATIONS BY TURKEY OF THE INDEPENDENCE
COMMA SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITIES OF CYPRUS
WHICH IS CAUSING SO MUCH HUMAN

LGD353 HIS PAGE 3/31

SUFFERING AND LOSS OF LIFE STOP MAY GOD GUIDE YOU IN YOUR
EFFORTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BETTER AND HAPPIER WORLD
STOP

* ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

NNN

Figure 13. Copy of Makarios' message to the American President Ford.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ Naval Postgraduate School, Declassified Documents Reference System, <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS;jsessionid=6F54449A87179A03F54547CF42CBC6AA?locID=navalps>. (May 2007).

ACTION 2107
VANCE-5
INFO:
AMB
DCM-3
POL-3
RR USA DATT
JUSKMAT TUSLOG
CHRON REVIEW

Classification

Control: 4455

Recd: 23NOV67

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 76-366

By , NARA Date 6-24-97

I M M E D I A T E

O 23063" NOV 67
FM SECSTATE
TO ANKARA
INFO ATHENS NICOSIA LONDON OTTAWA USUN NATO

~~SECRET~~ STATE 74031

TOVAN 4

FOR CYRUS VANCE FROM KATZENBACH

1. WE DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR ACCEPTING THIS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT MISSION AT A MOMENT'S NOTICE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE FACT THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO RECEIVE YOU MAY ALREADY HAVE FOR THE MOMENT AVERTED THE DANGER OF ARMED CONFLICT, BUT THIS EVENTUALITY REMAINS CRITICALLY POSSIBLE.

2. THE SECRETARY AND I SUGGEST THAT YOU MAY WISH TO INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN YOUR PRESENTATION TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT. AMBASSADOR HART MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL VIEWS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

3. THE URGENT FACT WHICH YOU WISH TO SET FORTH FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES, AND OF WHICH YOU ARE ENTIRELY CONVINCED SPEAKING AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN, IS THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN CONGRESS WOULD UTTERLY FAIL TO UNDERSTAND THE INITIATION OF MILITARY ACTION BY TURKEY WITHOUT FULLY EXHAUSTING THE AVAILABLE PROCESSES OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THE AMERICAN IN THE STREET WOULD THINK THAT A NATION WHICH CONSIDERED ITS VITAL INTERESTS TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

FORM F2-511
(5-68)

BE THREATENED, AND WHICH IS A MEMBER OF BOTH THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF NATO, WOULD HAVE RESORT TO THESE ORGANIZATIONS FIRST BEFORE TAKING A STEP WHICH COULD UNLEASH UPON ITSELF, AND UPON THE VERY PEOPLE ON CYPRUS WHOSE INTERESTS IT HAD PLEDGED ITSELF TO DEFEND, THE GRAVEST AND MOST TERRIBLE CONSEQUENCES.

4. IT MAY BE DIFFICULT FOR TURKEY TO APPRECIATE THIS ATTITUDE, AND TURKEY MAY THINK THAT ITS OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS REQUIRE IT TO ACT WHATEVER MAY BE THE CONSEQUENCES. YOU WISH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT FULLY TO APPRECIATE, HOWEVER, THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT MIGHT BE THE INTENTIONS AND DESIRES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE US GOVERNMENT, THE ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CONGRESS RESULTING FROM TURKISH MILITARY ACTION WOULD PRESENT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WITH AN UNCONTROLLABLE POLITICAL SITUATION SHOULD THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH SEEK TO PERSUADE THE CONGRESS TO CONTINUE THE PROGRAMS BY MEANS OF WHICH THE US GOVERNMENT HAS WILLINGLY AND ENTHUSIASTICALLY PARTICIPATED IN THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY AND IN STRENGTHENING ITS ABILITY TO RESIST THE HOSTILE PRESSURES TO WHICH IT HAS FOR YEARS BEEN SUBJECTTED.

5. ONE OF THE REASONS THAT THE US GOVERNMENT HAS SO WARMLY COOPERATED WITH TURKEY IN THIS RESPECT DERIVES FROM THE

PRESIDENT'S GREAT ADMIRATION FOR WHAT TURKEY HAS DONE BY ITS OWN EFFORTS TO PLACE ITSELF AMONG THE MODERN AND FORWARD-LOOKING NATIONS. THE PRESIDENT, YOU KNOW FOR A CERTAINTY, IS DEEPLY APPREHENSIVE LEST TURKEY THROW ALL THIS AWAY AS THE RESULT OF A MILITARY ACTION WHICH IN THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW WOULD NOT ONLY FAIL TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM WHICH SO RIGHTLY HAS BEEN A CAUSE OF DEEP CONCERN TO TURKEY BUT ALSO WOULD BRING GRAVE CONSEQUENCES EXTENDING WAY BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE.

6. GREAT AS IS TURKEY'S STAKE IN THE CYPRUS QUESTION, THIS STAKE IS INCOMMENSURATE WITH THE COST OF WAR.

THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES WILL DIE.
GRIEF AND DESTRUCTION WILL COME TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY.
THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE OFFERED AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE ITS INTERESTS IN THE AREA.
TURKEY WILL LOSE THE WARM AND SINCERE RESPECT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, WHO SIMPLY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE CYNICAL USE AGAINST A NEIGHBORING STATE OF AMERICAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO ARM TURKEY AGAINST A THREAT SHARED IN COMMON BY THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY.

THIS REACTION OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD INEVITABLY BE

—SECRET—

REFLECTED IN CONGRESS AND PRODUCE A SEVERELY RESTRICTIVE EFFECT UPON THE CONDUCT OF US RELATIONS WITH TURKEY.

7. FOR ALL THESE REASONS YOU ARE THERE TO OFFER YOUR SERVICES, AND THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, TO TURKEY IN A CONTINUING EFFORT TO AVERT A CATASTROPHE.

8. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT KNOWS THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO, AND THE US, BRITISH, AND CANADIAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE ALL BEEN ACTIVE IN ATTEMPTING TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THIS CRISIS. YOU URGE THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO GIVE TIME TO THESE EFFORTS. YOU DO NOT BELIEVE IN BEING PESSIMISTIC THAT THE EFFORTS WILL FAIL, AND YOU INTEND TO CONVEY TO THE GREEK GOVERNMENT THE SAME SENSE OF URGENCY AND THE SAME APPEAL FOR RESTRAINT AND UNDERSTANDING WHICH YOU HAVE SET BEFORE THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT.

9. YOU FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT TURKEY HAS SEEN ITS INTERESTS IMPAIRED AND ITS KINSMEN SUFFER IN BRUTAL COMMUNAL FIGHTING. IT IS NO DOUBT TRUE THAT THE WORLD HAS BEEN INSUFFICIENTLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS. THE GRAVITY OF THE CURRENT CRISIS, HOWEVER, HAS MADE THE WORLD REALIZE HOW DANGEROUS THE SITUATION IS. IN THIS NEW REALIZATION THERE SHOULD BE A GREATER HOPE FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE CYPRUS ISSUE. THE IMPORTANT POINT WHICH YOU WISH TO STRESS, HOWEVER, IS THAT THIS EFFORT MUST BE A PEACEFUL ONE. IN YOUR VIEW NO LASTING SOLUTION CAN BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY MILITARY ACTION. YOU MAKE THE STRONGEST APPEAL THAT WAR BE AVOIDED AND THAT THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION GO ON WITH THE HELP OF TURKEY'S FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

10. FYI. ALL OF HERE WISH TO GIVE YOU THE BROADEST DISCRETION IN CARRYING OUT THIS ASSIGNMENT. THE PRESIDENT, DEAN AND I HAVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN YOUR JUDGEMENT. WHAT IS SAID ABOVE IS, IF ANYTHING, AND UNDERSTATEMENT OF US REACTION TO A TURKISH STRIKE. NATO COULD WELL BE WRECKED, AND THE INDIAN-PAKISTAN BUSINESS WOULD BE A SIDESHOW COMPARED TO WHAT COULD HAPPEN IN A REAL GREEK-TURKISH WAR. WE HAVE PHRASED FOREGOING IN TERMS OF US PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL OPINION, WHICH MAY BE LESS OFFENSIVE THAN GOVERNMENTAL POSITION. MY GUESS IS THAT A REALLY MAJOR TURKISH STRIKE PLUS GREEK COUNTERATTACK WOULD FINISH OUR RELATIONS WITH BOTH. OUR EXPERTS POINT WITH REASON TO TURKISH PRIDE, ETC. THESE ARE REAL CONSIDERATIONS. BUT YOU SHOULD FEEL FREE TO LEAN ON EACH SIDE AS HARD AS NECESSARY. IF TURKS GO WE ARE NOT GOING TO BE WITH THEM AND THEY SHOULD KNOW THIS. IF TWENTY YEARS OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AREN'T WORTH SOME CONSIDERATION ON THEIR PART THEN OUR RELATIONSHIP IS FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED. YOU WILL HAVE TO PLAY THIS BY A SENSITIVE EAR, BUT DON'T HESITATE TO PUSH IN OUR STACK TO GET RESULTS. IN FACT, AS YOU KNOW, SERIOUSNESS OF REAL WAR HARD TO OVERSTATE. END FYI. GP-3. RUSK

MAX/1159

SECRET

Figure 14. Copy of the American denial to the Turkish ambitions.¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰ Naval Postgraduate School, Declassified Documents Reference System, <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS;jsessionid=6F54449A87179A03F54547CF42CBC6AA?locID=navalps>. (May 2007).

DP IMMEDIATE
ESAB09GUA410
DE RIOMGU 55595 1970030
D 160853Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5097
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2657

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 3367
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 2262
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4117
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 252
AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 140
AMCONSUL ADANA 3738
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 8309
AMCONSUL IZMIR 5031
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE 3159
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE 1588
USNMR SHAPE
USDCOSOUTH
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CINCUSAFE
EUCOM IMMEDIATE
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCEUR IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 5595

EUCOM FOR POLAD AND J-2
EO 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, CY, TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS COUP: LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
REF: A. ANKARA 5586; B. FBIS KYRENIA 160223Z; C. FBIS KYRENIA
160340Z; D. USDAO ANKARA 160650Z

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 3/27/01
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958

(Rf)

1. ACCORDING NEWS BROADCASTS AT 7:30 AND 10:00 A.M. TODAY (JUL 16):
A. TURKISH CABINET, MEETING UNTIL 4 A.M. TODAY, DECIDED
TO REQUEST PRESIDENT TO CALL PARLIAMENT INTO EMERGENCY SESSION
ON CYPRUS SITUATION. PRIMIN ECEVIT WILL MEET WITH HEADS OF
POLITICAL PARTIES AT 1100.
B. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN BIRGIT, ANSWERING JOURNALISTS'
QUESTIONS AFTER CABINET MEETING, SAID GOT HAS DETERMINED

*
KENNEDY, LL

RECALLED

DECLASSIFIED

Authority and 989625
By 36 NARA Date 10/13

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO PROTECT RIGHTS AND SECURITY OF TURK CYPRIOTS. UP TO MOMENT, HE CONTINUED, TURKEY HAD NOT RECEIVED DISQUIETING NEWS ABOUT SITUATION OF TURK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY, RIGHTS OF WHICH WERE UNDER TURKISH GUARANTEE.

C. A DIPLOMATIC APPROACH, BIRGIT SAID, HAD BEEN MADE TO UK. HE ALSO STATED THAT GNT WOULD RESPOND TO MESSAGE PRIMIN ECEVIT HAD RECEIVED FROM SECCEN WALDHEIM.

2. ECEVIT IS QUOTED IN PRESS AS OBSERVING TO NEWSPAPER MEN DURING BREAK IN CABINET MEETING THAT "THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THIS (COUP IN CYPRUS) WAS A (MAINLAND) GREEK INTERVENTION."

3. PRESS STATES THAT, FOLLOWING COUP, A NUMBER OF TURK NAVAL VESSELS SAILED FROM SOUTHERN PORT OF MERSIN OPPOSITE CYPRUS (WE HAVE NOTHING TO CONFIRM THIS). MEANWHILE, REF D REPORTS THAT FOUR TURK AF F-100'S HAVE BEEN PLACED ON ALERT AT INCIRLIK CDI.

SPAIN

BT

Figure 15. Copy of the American embassy's message to the U.S. Secretary,¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ Naval Postgraduate School, Declassified Documents Reference System, <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS;jsessionid=6F54449A87179A03F54547CF42CBC6AA?locID=navalps>. (May 2007).

MEMORANDUM FOR

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

RICHARD T. KENNEDY
ROSEMARY NIEHUSS

SUBJECT:

WSAG Meeting on Cyprus --
July 16, 10:30 a.m.

The purpose of this meeting is to examine our policy in terms of the way the situation on Cyprus seems to be evolving.

You could open by asking

- Mr. Colby to give a brief run-down on the current situation
- Mr. Sisco to give a reading on assessments from our embassies following the instructions that were sent out yesterday along lines established at that WSAG meeting.
- Ask for the clearest possible statement of Soviet military maneuvers.

A key element of the current situation is whether Makarios is alive and capable of developing resistance or whether he is dead and the coup has been successful. Some key questions that could be asked about US policy in either situation are the following:

Makarios is Alive

I. If Makarios is believed capable of mounting a resistance, including winning international support,

--What would be the advantages of the US moving in the direction of pressing Greece to call off its adventure in Cyprus? Is the US likely to succeed with Athens? How would this affect Ioannides position in Greece and US/Greece relations over the longer term?

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 3/21/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 13526

SECRET -- 2

--What are the advantages of the US keeping its hands off this situation. Would Makarios' resistance on Cyprus lead to a prolonged civil war which would continue to embroil Turkey and Greece in confrontation? If we kept our hands off, what would our strategy with the Soviets be if they exploited the situation of internal resistance by Makarios?

Makarios is Dead

If Makarios is and the coup is more or less "successful,"

--How would our strategy be different from that which we have been developing? Should we press the Greeks at a minimum to reassure Turkey and urge them on a course of action that would genuinely meet Turk fears?

--What are the chances that, even if the new government is solidly in, that a situation of prolonged civil war could develop. What preventive actions can the US take to help diffuse tensions. What would our strategy with the Soviets be?

IMMEDIATE ISSUES

--Recognition: What should our policy be if Makarios is alive? At what point will this question arise if he is dead?

--Public Posture: Should we revise our line at this point?

--US Installations: We want to be sure that our installations are protected and that we can keep them if possible after the situation settles down. We need a plan to assure that they are protected and also for alternate arrangements if this becomes necessary.

--E & E Plans: Are our E & E plans up to date? (Ask State). Are we fully prepared to implement them if necessary? At what point might evacuation become a reality?

--Contingency Plan: The Contingency Planning Working Group should have these under constant review with an eye to the scenarios that could unfold if Makarios is indeed alive.

Figure 16. Copy of the American National Security Council to the U.S. Secretary.¹⁸²

¹⁸² Naval Postgraduate School, Declassified Documents Reference System, <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS;jsessionid=6F54449A87179A03F54547CF42CBC6AA?locID=navalps>. (May 2007).

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Ayoob, Mohammed. "State Making, State Building, and State Failure." Chapter 9 in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001.
- Bahcheli, Tozun. "The Cypriot Challenge for Turkey: The Conquests of 1974 to Be Maintained." Sub-chapter in *Current Turkey*, Athens: Papazisis Publishings, 2002.
- Briefing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Cyprus: What If the Talks Fail? CSCE, Washington, D.C., March 2002.
- Brown, E. Michael. *Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and Implications* Chapter 13 in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001.
- Chatzianastasiou, Tassos. *Cyprus and Change-over: The Complex of Defeat*. Alternative Publishing, 2004.
- Clogg, Richard. A Short History of Modern Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Clogg, Richard, and Yannopoulos, G. Greece under Military Rule. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972.
- Couloumbis, Theodoros. The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle. New York: Praeger, 1983.
- Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Cyprus: International Law and the Prospects for Settlement. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991.
- Dagi, Ihsan D., "Human Rights and Democratization: The Turkish Foreign Policy in European Margin." Sub-chapter in *Current Turkey*, Athens: Papazisis Publishings, 2002.
- Dinkov, Dinko, and Stoyanov, Stoyan. "The Cyprus Problem: International Politics Simulation." *Managerial Law* 47:3/4 (2005). ABI/INFORM Global, 171,
<http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?index=1&did=922973211&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1144134795&clientId=11969&cfc=1>. (March 2007).
- Fallaci, Oriana. "An Interview with Archbishop Makarios III." November 1974.
<http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/makarios%20-20interview%20with%20fallaci.htm>. (May 2007).
- Fisk, Robert. "Pity the Nation: The abduction of Lebanon" New York, Atheneum 1990.

Gilbert, Richard. "Your Beatitude, Mr. President." Interview with Makarios, 1964. Nicosia, Cyprus, 1964.
[\(May 2007\).](http://www.threemonkeysonline.com/article_archbishop_makarios_richard_gilbert.htm)

Google,
http://images.google.com/images?q=pictures+of+Breshnev&ndsp=18&svnum=10&hl=en&rlz=1T4DMUS_enUS222US223&start=18&sa=N,
[\(March 2007\).](http://images.google.com/images?q=pictures+of+Denktas&ndsp=18&svnum=10&hl=en&rlz=1T4DMUS_enUS222US223&start=126&sa=N)

Hadgipavlou, Maria, and Trigeorgislenos, Trigeorgis. "Cyprus: An Evolutionary Approach to Conflict Resolution." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37:2 (June 1993) ABI/INFORM Global, 340.
[\(March 2007\).](http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?index=21&did=725001591&Src_hMode=1&sid=3&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=_1144137132&clientId=11969)

Heper, Metin. "Turkey: The Political System Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow." Sub-chapter, *Current Turkey*, Athens: Papazisis Publishings, 2002.

Joseph, Joseph S. *Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict, and International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1997.

Kissinger, Henry. *The Years of Upheaval* (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1982.

_____. *The Years of Renewal* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999.

Kypros-net Inc., "The World of Cyprus,"
http://kypros.org/Occupied_Cyprus/images/maps/cyprus_1974_657_bg.jpg (May 2007).

Le Bon, Gustave. *The Psychology of Masses*. Thessalonki: Zitros Publishing, 1996.

Lumsden, Malvern. "The Cyprus Conflict as a Prisoner's Dilemma Game. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 1973).

Naval Postgraduate School, Declassified Documents Reference System,
<http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS;jsessionid=6F54449A87179A03F54547CF42CBC6AA?locID=navalps> (May 2007).

Nouvelles d'Arménie Magazine, www.armenews.com,
<http://www.armenews.com/IMG/arton26355.jpg>. (May 2007).

O'Malley, Brendan, and Craig, Ian. *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage, and Turkish Invasion*. London, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999.

Pancyprian Refugee Committee. Refugees: A Tragic Aspect of the Cyprus Problem.

Richmond, Oliver P. Ethno-nationalism, Sovereignty and Negotiating Positions in the Cyprus Conflict: Obstacles to a Settlement. London. July 1999.

<http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?index=9&did=44038945&SrchMode=1&sid=3&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=144820061&clientId=11969&cfc=1>. (March 2007).

Scherer, John L. *Blocking the Sun: The Cyprus Conflict*. University of Minnesota, 1997.

Stern, Laurence. *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*. New York: NY Times Books, 1977.

Szulc, Tad. Peacekeeping and Diplomacy in Cyprus: 1964–1993. Carnegie Council Case Study Series on Ethics and International Affairs. Washington 1994.

Thies, Wallace J. *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003.

Trachtenberg, Marc. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945–1963*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Venezis, Helias. “The Cave” Chapter of “Argonautes” (Estia Publishing, Athens 1960).

Veremis, Thanos. *The History of Greco-Turkish Relations 1453–2003*. (Athens: I. Sideris Publishings, 2003).

Wilkinson, M. James. Moving Beyond Conflict Prevention to Reconciliation: Tackling Greek-Turkish Hostility. Carnegie Corporation of New York. New York, June 1999.

Windsor, Philip. NATO and the Cyprus Crisis. Institute for Strategic Studies. London, 1964.

Yennaris, Costas. *From the East*. London & Bath: Elliot & Thompson, 1999.

“In Search of the Missing: The Missing Persons of Cyprus, A Continuing Tragedy.”

“The Other Attestation: Secret: The minutes of 1st December 1974,” (Moli Publications, Nicosia 1991)

UN Resolution No. 3212. 1974. The Hellenic Electronic Center, Cyprus,
<http://www.greece.org/cyprus/UNRes3212.htm>. (May 2007).

United Nations. The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem. The Annan Plan. 31 March 2004. http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf. (May 2007).

Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Kissinger,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constantine_Karamanlis,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harold_Wilson,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_military_junta_of_1967-1974,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Makarios_III. (March 2007).

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
3. Professor Donald Abenheim
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
4. Professor Jeffrey Knopf
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California